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This Article identifies a new and previously unrecognized trend 
in class-action settlements: releases for the defendant’s future 
conduct. Such releases, which hold the defendant harmless for 
wrongs it will commit in the future, are unusually dangerous to 
class members and to the public. Even more than the “future 
claims” familiar to class-action scholars, future-conduct releases 
pose severe informational problems for class members and for 
courts. Worse, they create moral hazard for the defendant, give it 
concentrated power, and thrust courts into a prospective 
planning role they are ill-equipped to handle. 
Courts should guard against the dangers of future-conduct 
releases with a standard and a rule. The standard is heightened 
scrutiny for all settlements containing such releases; the Article 
describes the warning signs courts must be alert to and the 
safeguards courts should insist on. The rule is parity of 
preclusion: a class-action settlement may release future-conduct 
claims if and only if they could have been lost in litigation. Parity 
of preclusion elegantly harmonizes a wide range of case law 
while directly addressing the normative problems with future-
conduct releases. The Article concludes by applying its 
recommendations to seven actual future-conduct settlements, in 
each case yielding a better result or clearer explanation than the 
court was able to provide. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Class action lawyers have a new toy: the future-conduct release.1 
A settlement containing such a waiver forgives the defendant for 
 
 1. This footnote provides a brief overview of federal class action litigation under 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the reader in need of a primer or a 
review. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. State class actions are discussed briefly infra Part IV.B. 
  In a class action, one or more named parties sue or are sued “as representative 
parties on behalf of all members [of the class].” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). They may do so if: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there 
are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
Id. Courts commonly also require that it be feasible to determine objectively who is a 
member of the class. See, e.g., In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 248 F.R.D. 389, 395–96 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). In addition to satisfying these common prerequisites, each class must be 
certified under one of three subsections of Rule 23(b): 23(b)(1), when class members’ 
rights are inextricably linked; 23(b)(2), when “final injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole”; and 23(b)(3), when 
“questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members[] and . . . a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
Members of a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3) may exclude themselves from the class; 
however, this right is not guaranteed by the Federal Rules for members of classes certified 
under the first two subsections. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). 
  A case may proceed as a class action only if the court certifies it as one after 
entering findings that the prerequisites above are satisfied, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A), 
and directs appropriate notice to the class, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). Any judgment in the 
case, whether favorable or not, will be binding on class members. See Pelt v. Utah, 539 
F.3d 1271, 1284 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that “[i]t is well settled that a class action 
judgment is binding on all class members” provided that “absent members were ‘in fact’ 
adequately represented by parties who are present”). After certification, any settlement or 
voluntary dismissal of class members’ “claims, issues, or defenses” requires court approval. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). If the settlement would bind class members, the Rule requires 
further notice to class members, an opportunity for them to object, a finding by the court 
that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” and, for Rule 23(b)(3) classes, a 
further opportunity for class members to opt out. Id. It is possible to file simultaneously a 
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trespasses it has not yet committed. For example, the proposed 
Google Books settlement would have released Google from liability 
for copyright infringements committed well into the twenty-second 
century.2 Others would give defendants permission to commit 
trespasses, create nuisances, adopt poison pills, and perhaps even 
violate the antitrust laws.3 
This is new. And it is a problem. To see why, consider a more 
familiar problem in class-action settlements: future claims. Some of 
the victims of a mass toxic tort will take years to get sick. A badly 
designed settlement can trade away the victims’ rights before they 
even know what is at stake.4 The 1984 Agent Orange settlement 
simply did not provide for payments to veterans who died or were 
disabled after 1994.5 Veterans who developed cancer later in the 
1990s found the compensation fund gone.6 All that was left was the 
clause of the settlement purporting to bar their claims.7 
 
class settlement and a motion for certification contingent on approval of the settlement 
but in general a so-called “settlement class” must satisfy all of the usual prerequisites for 
certification. Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–22 (1997). 
  Class-action litigation is lawyer-directed rather than client-directed. The class is 
represented by class counsel, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1), but class counsel “may not have a 
full client-lawyer relationship with each member of the class.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 13 (2010). While class counsel have a fiduciary duty to “fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the class,” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4), this is a “duty to 
the class as a whole [that] frequently diverges from the opinion of . . . the named plaintiff.” 
Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 726 F.2d 956, 964 (3d Cir. 1983). Indeed, a 
settlement may be approved even over the objections of one or more named 
representatives. See Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 590–91 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 2. See Amended Settlement Agreement § 17.3, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. 
Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 CV 8136-DC), ECF No. 770-2 [hereinafter Authors 
Guild Settlement] (stating that settlement “shall expire on the date on which the last U.S. 
copyright in any Book or Insert terminates”). Since copyright endures for seventy years 
after the death of the author, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006), the books of an author who died 
in 2050 would have been governed by the settlement through 2120. Any document from 
the Authors Guild case identified with an ECF number is available through 
http://thepublicindex.org. 
 3. See infra Part V. 
 4. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(introducing plaintiffs as two Vietnam veterans who developed cancer after the 1994 cut-
off date for compensation under the settlement), aff’d in part by an equally divided court, 
vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 
740, 746–48, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (approving settlement of future claims against chemical 
companies by Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange), aff’d 818 F.2d 226 (2nd Cir. 
1987). 
 5. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 253. 
 6. See, e.g., id. at 255–56. 
 7. See id. at 253. The Second Circuit held that the interests of these future victims 
had not been adequately represented in the prior litigation, and thus vacated the 
settlement as to them. Id. at 261. 
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Courts and scholars have come to recognize the extraordinary 
dangers of future-claim releases for class members. In a pair of 
decisions rejecting sweeping asbestos settlements, the Supreme Court 
held that the interests of present and future victims are so 
unavoidably opposed that the one group cannot “fairly and 
adequately protect the interests” of the other.8 The result is that class 
counsel seeking a quick payout for present victims are not allowed to 
sell the defendant the class’s future claims on the cheap—at least not 
if the court is doing its job. Scholars have produced a voluminous 
literature on the “futures problem,” debating when future-claim 
releases are appropriate and how best to police their use.9 
 
 8. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4); see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856–57 
(1999); Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997). 
 9. The term “futures problem” comes from Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., The Futures 
Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1902–03 (2000). For discussion of the issues future 
claims raise, see generally Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with 
Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2003) (discussing 
contractarian justifications for ex ante resolution of claims); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class 
Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995) 
(describing dangers of collusion between defendants and class counsel, particularly where 
future claims are concerned); Howard M. Erichson, Uncertainty and the Advantage of 
Collective Settlement, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 627 (2011) (describing different forms of 
uncertainty in class litigation, some of them tied to uncertainty about future events); 
Deborah R. Hensler, Bringing Shutts into the Future: Rethinking Protection of Future 
Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 585 (2006) (proposing that courts 
should require that settlements compensate present and future claimants equally); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1649 (2008) (discussing how settlement designs can accentuate or dissipate intraclass 
conflicts, with application to future claims); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and 
Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 345 (1999) (describing 
future-claim settlements as “the secular equivalent of a plenary indulgence”); Susan P. 
Koniak, How Like a Winter? The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied Adequate 
Representation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1787 (2004) (discussing treatment of future 
claims in Agent Orange litigation); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: 
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995) (describing in 
detail the problematic terms in one settlement); Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in 
Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
581 (2003) (discussing whether present and future claimants should be included in the 
same class); Linda S. Mullenix, Back to the Futures: Privatizing Future Claims Resolution, 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1919 (2000) (examining the future of future claims resolution following 
the Supreme Court’s Amchem and Ortiz decisions); Richard A. Nagareda, Administering 
Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287 (2003) (discussing different ways of 
characterizing present and future claimants); Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and 
Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2002) [hereinafter 
Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options] (arguing that future claimants should be 
given “put options” to sell their claims at a later date); Richard A. Nagareda, Future Mass 
Tort Claims and the Rule-Making/Adjudication Distinction, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1781 (2000) 
(comparing different institutional mechanisms for handling future claims); Alex 
Raskolnikov, Is There a Future for Future Claimants After Amchem Products, Inc. v. 
Windsor?, 107 YALE L.J. 2545 (1998) (proposing a “global limited fund mandatory 
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settlement class action with a modified pro rata distribution of benefits for past and future 
claimants” as a fair and efficient way to deal with mass torts); David Rosenberg, 
Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Actions for Future Loss, 
88 VA. L. REV. 1871 (2002) (arguing that mandatory global class actions can best 
compensate victims while providing optimal deterrence of socially undesirable conduct); 
George Rutherglen, Future Claims in Mass Tort Cases: Deterrence, Compensation, and 
Necessity, 88 VA. L. REV. 1989 (2002) (commenting on Rosenberg’s argument); Peter H. 
Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941 
(1995) (arguing for stronger back-end opt-out rights whenever the value of claims is 
initially unpredictable); Robert P. Schuwerk, Future Class Actions, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 63 
(1987) (arguing that future class actions should only be employed where stringent 
preconditions are satisfied); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 
88 NW. U. L. REV. 469 (1994) (describing potential conflicts between present and future 
claimants); Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class 
Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439 (1996) (discussing the problem of 
future injury in the context of asbestos litigation and suggesting changes to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure to protect future claimants); Diane P. Wood, Commentary on 
The Futures Problem, by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1933 (2000) 
(providing an overview of Hazard’s The Futures Problem and suggesting some changes to 
the analysis in that article); Note, And Justiciability for All? Future Injury Plaintiffs and the 
Separation of Powers, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1066 (1996) (“explor[ing] the justiciability of 
actions by future injury plaintiff actions by examining whether a claim of future injury in a 
class action presents, in any scenario, an Article III case or controversy”); Jeremy Gaston, 
Note, Standing on Its Head: The Problem of Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 
77 TEX. L. REV. 215 (1998) (arguing for a “bright line denial of standing to exposure-only 
claimants in mass tort class actions who seek compensation for their future injuries”); 
Elizabeth R. Kaczynski, Note, The Inclusion of Future Members in Rule 23(b)(2) Class 
Actions, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 397 (1985) (arguing that including future members in class 
actions “is inconsistent with both the explicit requirements and the theoretical 
underpinnings of Rule 23” and poses “a serious threat to the due process rights of future 
members”); Daniel M. Weddle, Note, Settlement Class Actions and “Mere-Exposure” 
Future Claimants: Problems in Mass Toxic Tort Liability, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 113 (1998) 
(discussing the major problems facing exposure-only future claimants, ways in which 
courts have dealt with these issues, and proposed solutions). 
  The issue of future claims is also a problem of substantive tort law. See generally 
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625 
(2002) (aiming to “illuminate and help guide tort practice by attending to a set of 
theoretical and conceptual questions” raised by “future injury” or “inchoate tort” cases, 
including the role of “injury” in tort law); Andrew R. Klein, Fear of Disease and the Puzzle 
of Futures Cases in Tort, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965 (2002) (examining treatment of fear 
of disease in toxic tort cases and asserting that courts should permit claimants to recover 
damages for emotional distress whenever that fear of disease is reasonable). Because of 
these tort-law issues, which vary significantly between states, it is not possible to state a 
simple and general rule on when a future claim based on past conduct ripens into one 
capable of being litigated. In an asbestos-exposure case, for example, ripeness will depend 
on the legal viability of medical-monitoring and increased-risk claims and fact-bound 
issues about the threshold of injury that qualifies as compensable. In general, mere 
exposure to a substance capable of causing harm will not suffice, but where beyond that 
lies the line between “present” and “future” claims is a matter of great and active dispute. 
  Another significant distinction worth noting is that between present and future 
claimants. In some cases—such as the Authors Guild case—there is no significant division 
within the class because the future claims are all held by persons who also hold present 
claims. In other cases, such as the mass asbestos cases, many of the holders of future 
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Future-conduct releases, though, are a bridge beyond future-
claim releases. Consider a simple hypothetical future-conduct 
settlement. The Warhol Soup Company sells a bad batch of tomato 
soup, leading to a well-publicized outbreak of twenty-four hour food 
poisoning. A class-action firm files a suit on behalf of a class of all of 
Warhol’s customers, then negotiates a settlement. In return for cash 
payments to class members with documented illness, they will give 
Warhol Soup a general release for liability arising out of its conduct, 
past and future. 
There is something obviously wrong with this settlement. But it is 
not the same something courts and scholars usually talk about when 
they talk about “future claims.” There are no present-future conflicts 
within the Warhol Soup class; the stomach bug has already done most 
of the harm it will ever do, and the settlement is perfectly uniform 
toward class members.10 Instead, the settlement is flawed in other 
ways. For example, the compensation schedule may have been 
designed with gastroenteritis in mind, but what if next time it’s 
botulism? Worse, the settlement is likely to lead to more food 
poisoning in the future because it undermines Warhol Soup’s 
incentive to be careful going forward. 
Thus, future-conduct releases raise the stakes for class members. 
Past-conduct settlements are limited to compensation for harms the 
defendant has already caused (even if those harms have not yet 
manifested themselves). But future-conduct releases can change the 
world in ways that cause entirely new harms to class members. 
Because they deal so extensively with the unknown and changeable 
future, future-conduct settlements can be unusually hard for courts 
and class members to understand. They can create serious moral 
hazard for the released defendant in subtle and surprising ways. 
Future-conduct releases increase the risks that the reviewing court 
will miss the warning signs and approve a bad settlement. 
There is also a more fundamental problem: courts should not be 
in this business at all. Future-conduct releases open the door to 
sweeping prospective changes in the substance of the law. This is the 
 
claims have no present claims. In these cases, there are difficult problems about whether, 
and under what circumstances, the holders of future claims may be placed in the same 
class as the holders of present claims. Amchem analyzed this issue in terms of adequate 
representation: the future claimants could not be included because they were not 
vigorously represented by their own unconflicted class counsel. Amchem Prods. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997). 
 10. Thus, proposals designed to ensure equality between present and future claimants 
do not really speak to future-conduct settlements. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 9, at 588. 
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province of legislation, not adjudication. The Warhol Soup settlement 
is tantamount to tort reform: it takes future product-liability cases out 
of the judicial system entirely. But this is not tort reform enacted by a 
democratically elected and politically accountable legislature and 
imposed equally on all businesses. Instead, it is a private agreement 
for the benefit of a single company, drafted in secret by a handful of 
lawyers and “enacted” by a judge. In the words of the Department of 
Justice, this is “a bridge too far.”11 
Few actual class-action lawyers are this unsubtle. But they are 
hardly unambitious or unimaginative. The Google Books settlement 
would have established the world’s largest bookstore.12 The 
settlement would have bound millions of class members13 and 
payments to copyright owners could have reached into the billions of 
dollars.14 The pending $7 billion settlement in an antitrust lawsuit 
against Visa and MasterCard would prevent businesses—including 
ones not yet in business—from objecting to many of their policies 
until 2021.15 Other class-action settlements have tried to use future-
 
 11. Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed 
Amended Settlement Agreement at 3, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 Civ. 8136-DC), ECF No. 922 [hereinafter Statement of Interest 
II]. 
 12. See infra Part I.A. 
 13. See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum Responding to Specific Objections at 2 
n.2, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136-DC), ECF No. 955 (estimating 
class size at “hundreds of thousands, or millions”); Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book 
Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 479, 545 n.350 (2011) (giving reasons 
for estimate that settlement class could number tens of millions). 
 14. “Google . . . scanned more than 12 million books,” Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 
at 670, a large percentage of which are in copyright, see Samuelson, supra note 13, at 545 
n.350 (“Google has estimated that 20 percent of the books it has scanned so far from 
libraries are in the public domain . . . .”). The settlement called for $45 million in up-front 
payments directly to copyright owners. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 2.1. 
Future revenue streams under the settlement were necessarily an estimate, but the United 
States book market currently brings in revenue of about $27 billion a year. Book Pub. in 
the US: Market Research Report, IBISWORLD (June 2012), http://www.ibisworld.com 
/industry/default.aspx?indid=1233. If half that market had moved to e-books, and Google 
took ten percent of the market, and ten percent of Google’s share came from books under 
the settlement, that would have yielded settlement-related revenues to Google of $135 
million a year. If the settlement had been a success and catapulted Google to a position of 
dominance in the e-book market, those numbers could have been much, much higher. 
 15. See Class Settlement Agreement ¶ 2(b), In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & 
Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., No. 05-MD-1720-JG-JO (E.D.N.Y. filed July 13, 2012), ECF 
No. 1588-1 (defining settlement class to include “all persons, businesses, and other entities 
that as of the Settlement Preliminary Approval Date or in the future accept [Visa or 
MasterCard]” (emphasis added)); id. ¶¶ 39–65 (twenty-seven-page description of new 
rules to be adopted by Visa and MasterCard); id. ¶ 71 (stating that the release precludes 
class members from seeking relief “relating to the period after the date of the Court’s 
entry of the Class Settlement Preliminary Approval Order with respect to any Rule of any 
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conduct releases to transfer easements to telecommunications 
companies,16 to insulate the NFL’s pay-per-view packages from 
antitrust scrutiny,17 and to nullify shareholder objections to the News 
Corporation’s anti-takeover defenses.18 If the courts were to allow 
future-conduct releases in general, the sky would be the limit: it is 
possible to imagine doing eminent domain or health-care reform 
through an appropriately crafted settlement.19 
The courts have recognized that future-conduct releases raise 
difficult questions. But they have not been able to give satisfying 
answers. In a May 2011 decision, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.,20 the 
Southern District of New York rejected the Google Books 
settlement.21 But five months later, in In re Literary Works in 
Electronic Databases Copyright Litigation, the Second Circuit held 
that an extraordinarily similar settlement authorizing electronic 
databases to sell online access to articles was potentially permissible.22 
Each settlement would have allowed the defendant to make class 
members’ copyrighted works available online23 in exchange for 
 
[defendant] . . . as it . . . may be modified in the manner provided in [the settlement]”); see 
also Adam J. Levitin, An Analysis of the Proposed Interchange Fee Litigation Settlement 
14–19 (Aug. 21, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2133361 (discussing settlement’s releases with skepticism). 
 16. See First Amended & Restated Class Settlement Agreement at 13, Uhl v. 
Thoroughbred Tech. & Telecomms, Inc., No. IP00-C-1232-B/S, 2001 WL 987840 (S.D. Ind. 
Aug. 28, 2001), aff’d 309 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 2002), available at http://www. 
fiberopticfundi.com/adobe/SettlementAgreementForWeb.pdf (defining “Settlement Class 
Claims” to include claims that “may be asserted now or in the future . . . relating to . . . 
[defendant’s future] installation, operation, maintenance, renewal, marketing, and transfer 
[of a fiber-optic cable]”). 
 17. See Revised Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, ¶ II.y, Schwartz v. Dallas 
Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 157 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (no. 97-cv-5184), 
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20011218215257/http://www. 
nfllawsuitsettlement.com/stipagreement.shtml (defining “Released Class Claims” to 
include any claim “subsequently arising out of or resulting from . . . conduct authorized by 
the Agreement”). 
 18. See UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 898 A.2d 344, 347–48 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“In the 
Redrafted Settlement, the parties included a provision clarifying that the release does not 
extend to ‘claims challenging the merits of future conduct . . . .’ The same sentence, 
however, contains a parenthetical excepting claims relating to the adoption of the October 
2006 Rights Plan.”). 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 21. Id. at 679. 
 22. See In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242, 247–49 
(2d Cir. 2011). 
 23. Compare Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 10.1(d) (defining released 
claims to include “after the Effective Date, any act or omission authorized by this 
Amended Settlement Agreement”), and id. § 4.2 (authorizing sale of digital books to 
consumers), with Settlement Agreement § 13.b, In re Literary Works, 654 F.3d 242 (MDL 
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payments to class members.24 They purported to apply the same legal 
test.25 They were even negotiated by the same class counsel.26 And yet 
releases that “exceed[ed] what the Court may permit”27 in Authors 
Guild were “not improper” in Literary Works.28 In other future-
conduct cases, the Seventh Circuit held that it was broadly free to 
“address the entire suit” and approve such releases,29 but the 
Delaware Court of Chancery held flatly the opposite: “The rule in 
Delaware is that a release cannot apply to future conduct.”30 
If the courts are adrift when dealing with future-conduct releases, 
one reason may be that they have had little help from the scholarly 
community. The scholarship on future-conduct releases is all but 
nonexistent.31 No one has ever clearly distinguished future-claim 
releases from future-conduct releases. A few articles recognize that 
class actions raise troubling issues when they purport to adjudicate 
the rights of “future class members” who will be injured by actions 
the defendant takes in the future.32 But in many future-conduct-
release cases, these “future class members” are the same people as 
 
No. 1379) (providing that articles may “be electronically reproduced, distributed, 
displayed, licensed, sold, or adapted by [defendants]”). 
 24. Compare Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 4.5(a)(i) (requiring Google to 
pay to copyright owners seventy percent of net revenues from future sales of the digital 
books covered by the settlement), and id. § 5.1(a) (requiring Google to make one-time 
payment of sixty dollars for each book previously digitized), with Settlement Agreement 
§ 4, In re Literary Works, 654 F.3d 242 (MDL No. 1379) (creating schedule of one-time 
payments for the articles covered by the settlement), and id. § 5.a (reducing payments by 
thirty-five percent for those authors who opt out of allowing future uses). 
 25. Compare Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 675 (“identical factual predicate”), 
with In re Literary Works, 654 F.3d at 248 (“identical factual predicate”) (quoting TBK 
Partners, Ltd. v. W. Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982)). The identical factual 
predicate doctrine is discussed in more detail infra Part IV.B. 
 26. Compare Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 669 (listing appearance of Michael J. 
Boni for Author Plaintiffs), with In re Literary Works, 654 F.3d at 244 (listing appearance 
of Michael J. Boni for plaintiffs). See generally Michael J. Boni, BONI & ZACK LLC 
(2010), http://bonizack.com/michael-j-boni (listing Boni’s experience as lead counsel on 
both settlements). 
 27. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 677. 
 28. In re Literary Works, 654 F.3d at 248. 
 29. Uhl v. Thoroughbred Tech. & Telecomms., Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 984 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 30. Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 898 A.2d 344, 348 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
 31. Samuel Bray has discussed “preventive adjudication,” in which “a plaintiff seeks 
only a declaration and does so to avoid future harm.” Samuel L. Bray, Preventive 
Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2010). This concept focuses on purely 
declaratory relief: i.e., judgments that merely restate more clearly the contents of pre-
existing legal norms. But a defining characteristic of future-conduct releases is that they 
can deliberately alter parties’ rights prospectively; they go beyond the merely declaratory. 
 32. See, e.g., Schuwerk, supra note 9, at 67 (defining “future class members” to include 
“persons who, at the time of inquiry, have not had the type of contact or relationship with 
the defendant that gives rise to the litigation”). 
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the present class members who indisputably have present claims 
against the defendant.33 
This Article fills this gap. It makes three contributions to the 
literature on class actions. First, it identifies a novel feature of class-
action settlements: future-conduct releases by class members. Second, 
it explains why such releases can be dangerous to class members and 
to society. Third, it explains what to do about it. 
Courts should not prohibit future-conduct releases outright. 
Instead, they should guard against the dangers these releases pose 
with a standard and a rule. The standard is an enhancement of the 
Rule 23(e) requirement that a court may only approve a class-action 
settlement on a finding that it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”34 
The Article supplies a list of factors courts should incorporate into 
the Rule 23(e) inquiry when they are faced with a future-conduct 
settlement. Those factors will help courts think through the distinctive 
risks of future-conduct settlements and identify appropriate 
safeguards. 
The rule is simpler: a settlement may release only those claims 
that the class could have lost in litigation. The common thread 
running through the problems with future-conduct releases is that 
they sever the connection between the settlement and the underlying 
lawsuit. The Warhol Soup settlement is not really a “settlement” of 
the product-liability lawsuit; it is a freestanding, prospective change in 
the applicable law. The class action is just an excuse, a procedural 
vehicle that gets the parties into court and is then turned around to 
bind class members to the terms of the deal. The result is like a mass-
market contract with none of the respect for personal autonomy—or 
like negotiated rulemaking with none of the procedural safeguards. 
What it is not like is a lawsuit litigated through to judgment. 
Requiring parity between litigation and settlement brings future-
conduct releases back to earth: it restores the essential nexus that 
makes settlements a proper use of judicial power in the first place. 
Heightened scrutiny and parity of preclusion aren’t just good 
ideas: they’re the law. Each is rooted in the text of Rule 23 and in the 
Constitution. Heightened scrutiny flows from the provisions in Rule 
23 that ensure adequate representation for class members at all times 
and from the Due Process Clause. Parity of preclusion, for its part, is 
jurisdictional: future-conduct claims that could not be precluded in 
litigation are categorically unripe. They do not present live “questions 
 
 33. Future class members are discussed further infra note 236. 
 34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
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of law or fact” with respect to which a class could be certified under 
Rule 23, and they are not part of the same Article III case or 
controversy as the underlying lawsuit. 
The Article will proceed in five parts, with the Google Books 
settlement serving as a running example. Part I will explain in detail 
how future-conduct releases work. Part II will explain the normative 
problems such releases raise. Part III will introduce and defend the 
heightened-scrutiny standard as a simple and administrable response 
to their dangers. Part IV will do the same for the parity-of-preclusion 
rule. Part V will apply the Article’s recommendations to concrete 
cases. A brief Conclusion will do exactly what it says on the tin. 
I.  FUTURE-CONDUCT RELEASES 
In order to understand why future-conduct releases in class-
action settlements are dangerous, it is necessary to understand clearly 
what a “future-conduct release” is. The place to start is with the 
preeminent modern example of one, the rejected Google Books 
settlement in Authors Guild v. Google Inc. 
A.  An Example: Google Books 
The Google Books project is the company’s “moon shot,”35 with 
the explicit goal of creating a new Library of Alexandria.36 Google 
ultimately hoped to include a digital copy of every book ever printed 
in this universal library.37 In 2004, Google began partnering with 
research libraries, which supply Google with books from their 
 
 35. Jeffrey Toobin, Google’s Moon Shot, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 5, 2007, at 30 
(quoting Marissa Mayer). 
 36. See Brief of Google, Inc. in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Amended 
Settlement Agreement at 66–67, Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 CV 8136-DC) [hereinafter Brief of Google in Support] (claiming 
that fire set by Julius Caesar in 47 B.C. caused the destruction of 700,000 volumes in the 
Library and calling settlement “another small step toward the vision that the Alexandrian 
Library represents”); Sergey Brin, A Library to Last Forever, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009, at 
A31 (describing Google Books as a program to prevent the loss of human knowledge, as 
occurred in the burning of the Library of Alexandria). Google’s account of the destruction 
of the Library is disputed by scholars. See EDWARD ALEXANDER PARSONS, THE 
ALEXANDRIAN LIBRARY: GLORY OF THE HELLENIC WORLD 288–319 (Am. Elsevier 
Publ’g Co., Inc. 1952) (surveying ancient sources on what did or did not happen to the 
Library in 47 B.C.). Ironically, this is the very book Google’s brief cites as an example of a 
scholarly work that the settlement would have helped preserve and make available. See 
Brief of Google in Support, supra, at 66–67. History aside, the metaphor itself is 
problematic. See Mary Murrell, Digital + Library: Mass Book Digitization as Collective 
Inquiry, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 221, 226–31 (2010) (tracing history of “universal library” 
metaphor). 
 37. See Toobin, supra note 35, at 30. 
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collections.38 Google takes the books offsite, photographs them using 
specially built book scanners, and processes the images with software 
to reconstruct the text of the books.39 The text is fed into an index so 
that Google Books’ users can search for terms in the text of the 
scanned books.40 If the library wishes, it can receive a digital copy of 
the book in return.41 
Copyright law complicated things, as it always does. Some books 
were in the public domain, and some copyright owners gave Google 
explicit permission.42 But for everything else, Google displayed only 
short “snippets” as search results: an eighth of a page around the 
place the search term appears in the book.43 After objections from 
copyright owners, Google added an opt-out: a book’s copyright 
owner could prevent it from being scanned at all.44 This was not 
sufficient for authors and publishers, who filed suit in the fall of 2005 
in two parallel lawsuits, one of them styled as a class action.45 It was 
widely expected that Google’s defense would center on fair use.46 
 
 38. For a detailed history of the project, lawsuit, and settlement through the end of 
2009, see generally Jonathan Band, The Long and Winding Road to the Google Books 
Settlement, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 227 (2009). 
 39. See Deposition of Daniel Clancy, Authors Guild v. Google at 63, Authors Guild, 
770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 CV 8136-DC), filed as exhibit 10 to Declaration of Edward 
Rosenthal, Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, No. 11-CV-6351 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012), ECF 
No. 114-10 (describing the scanning process). 
 40. Id. at 64–66. 
 41. See, e.g., Cooperative Agreement Between Google Inc. and the Regents of the 
Univ. of Mich./Univ. Library § 2.5 (Dec. 14, 2004), http://thepublicindex.org/docs 
/libraries/michigan.pdf. Further agreements between Google and its partner libraries are 
available at http://thepublicindex.org/documents/libraries. 
 42. See What You’ll See When You Search on Google Books, GOOGLE BOOKS, http:// 
books.google.com/intl/en/googlebooks/screenshots.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2013) 
(describing and illustrating full view and limited preview). 
 43. See id. (describing and illustrating snippet view). 
 44. See Adam M. Smith, Making Books Easier to Find, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG 
(Aug. 12, 2005, 1:31 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/08/making-books-easier-to-
find.html. 
 45. See Class Action Complaint, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 CV 8136); Complaint, McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 
05 CV 8881 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2005). The two cases were “coordinated for all pre-trial 
purposes.” Case Management Order Regarding Coordination and Scheduling at 1, 
Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 CV 8136-JES), ECF No. 29. In 2011, the 
Authors Guild and other authors’ groups sued five of Google’s library partners over their 
use of the digital copies. See Complaint at 1–2, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 11 
CIV 6351 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011). 
 46. Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement that permits a 
defendant to argue that her conduct, as measured by four open-ended and capacious 
factors, is more socially beneficial than enforcement of the plaintiff’s copyright would be. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). “The policies underlying modern fair use law include 
promoting freedom of speech and of expression, the ongoing progress of authorship, 
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Google’s fair use argument is persuasive but hardly conclusive, and 
scholarly opinion is split on whether fair use applies.47 
Complicating matters even further were the “orphan books”—
books under copyright, but whose copyright owners cannot be located 
by someone wanting to make use of the work.48 Although estimates 
of the number of orphan books vary widely—from well under 500,000 
to two million or more49—their existence makes it all but impossible 
 
learning, access to information, truth telling or truth seeking, competition, technological 
innovation, and privacy and autonomy interests of users.” Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling 
Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2541–42 (2009). A fair use win on summary 
judgment would have terminated the lawsuit in Google’s favor. Cf. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc. 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 
676 F.3d 19 (2d. Cir. 2012) (awarding summary judgment to Google in a putative class 
action prior to class-certification motions, specifically finding no infringement due to the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s safe harbor provision). 
 47. Compare Matthew Sag, The Google Book Settlement and the Fair Use 
Counterfactual, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 19, 24–37 (2010) (arguing that a court would have 
found fair use), and Hannibal Travis, Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes for 
Authors, or Napster for Books?, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 87, 126–39 (2006) (giving reasons to 
support the fair use argument), with Doug Lichtman, Copyright as Innovation Policy: 
Google Book Search from a Law and Economics Perspective, in 9 INNOVATION POLICY 
AND THE ECONOMY 55, 62 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2008), available at 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8184.pdf?new_window=1 (arguing that “Google’s fair use 
claim fails in its current form because its legal argument and its actual practices both 
sweep too broadly”). Some scholars take a middle ground. See Oren Bracha, Standing 
Copyright Law on Its Head?  The Googlization of Everything and the Many Faces of 
Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1855–60 (2007) (“The unpredictability and the ex post 
discretionary nature of the present [fair use] doctrine make it a highly unsuitable 
foundation on which to build a proper opt-out regime for digital libraries.”); Steven 
Hetcher, The Half-Fairness of Google’s Plan to Make the World’s Collection of Books 
Searchable, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 21–58 (2006) (arguing that snippets 
are a fair use, but that the database and library digital copies are not); Douglas Lichtman, 
Google Book Search in the Gridlock Economy, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 131, 137–42 (2011) 
(arguing that narrower versions of the Google Books program targeted at orphan works 
would be fair); Samuelson, supra note 13, at 487–93 (giving arguments on both sides). 
Several courts have held that Google’s Web search engine makes fair uses of the webpages 
it crawls and indexes. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 719–25 (9th 
Cir. 2007); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1117–23 (D. Nev. 2006). The 
plaintiffs, however, dispute the analogy between books and webpages. See Plaintiffs’ 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Google’s Motion to Dismiss at 17 n.8, 
Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 CV 8136-DC), ECF No. 997. 
 48. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT 
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 2 (2006) (“ ‘orphan works[]’ is a term used to describe 
the situation where the owner of a copyrighted work cannot be identified and located by 
someone who wishes to make use of the work in a manner that requires permission of the 
copyright owner.”), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf. 
 49. See Michael Cairns, 580,388 Orphan Works—Give or Take, PERSONANONDATA 
(Sept. 9, 2009), http://personanondata.blogspot.com/2009/09/580388-orphan-works-give-
or-take.html (estimating an upper bound of 580,388 orphan books published in the United 
States since 1920); JOHN P. WILKIN, COUNCIL ON LIBRARY & INFO. RES., 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC INDETERMINACY AND THE SCALE OF PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
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to create a comprehensive book search engine through individual 
negotiations. Congress has twice considered but not passed legislation 
to allow broader uses of orphan works.50 Even those bills, however, 
would not have enabled Google Book Search, because they would 
have required a specific and “diligent” effort to locate the owner.51 
In October 2008, following two and a half years of intense and 
secret negotiations52 the parties announced a proposed settlement. It 
ran to over 140 pages with more than a dozen attachments.53 Between 
then and the February 2010 fairness hearing, the settlement received 
hundreds of objections including two Statements of Interest 
submitted by the United States government raising antitrust and 
class-action concerns.54 
Under the settlement, Google would have been allowed to 
continue scanning and searching books, much as before.55 In return, it 
 
OF “RIGHTS” IN DIGITAL COLLECTION BUILDING (Feb. 2011), 
http://www.clir.org/pubs/ruminations/01wilkin/wilkin.html/wilkin.pdf (estimating in the 
conclusion that 2.5 million orphan books in a collection of 5 million books have been 
digitized by Google and its library partners). 
 50. See Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 
2008) (passed in the Senate Sept. 28, 2008 and referred to the House Committee on the 
Judiciary); Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006) (referred to 
the House Committee on the Judiciary). 
 51. See Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008 § 2 (amending 17 U.S.C. 
§ 514(b)(2)(A) to define “qualifying searches” as requiring “a diligent effort”); Orphan 
Works Act of 2006 § 2 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 514(a)(1)(i) to require “a reasonably 
diligent search”). The Acts were not drafted with mass digitization projects like Google’s 
in mind; U.S. Copyright Office, Legal Issues in Mass Digitization: A Preliminary Analysis 
and Discussion Document, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. (Oct. 2011), http://www.copyright.gov 
/docs/massdigitization/USCOMassDigitization_October2011.pdf. 
 52. Roy Blount Jr., $125 Million Settlement in Authors Guild v. Google, THE 
AUTHORS GUILD (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/125-million-
settlement-in-authors-guild-v-google/. 
 53. See Declaration of Michael J. Boni in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Preliminary Settlement Approval at 4, 134, 144, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. 
Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 CV 8136-DC), ECF No. 56. 
 54. See Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed 
Class Settlement, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 CV 8136-DC), ECF No. 720 
[hereinafter Statement of Interest I]; Statement of Interest II, supra note 11. See generally 
Responses, THE PUBLIC INDEX, http://thepublicindex.org/documents/responses (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2013) (collecting objections to the Authors Guild Settlement). In the fall of 
2009, the parties withdrew the settlement and replaced it with an amended one that was 
narrower in various ways. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2. This Article will 
discuss only the terms of the amended settlement, except where the initial settlement’s 
terms raise an issue particularly on point with the analysis. 
 55. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 1.52 (defining “Display Uses” to 
include “Snippet Display”); id. § 1.147 (defining “Snippet Display” as “up to three (3) 
‘snippets’ (each snippet being about three (3) to four (4) lines of text) per search term per 
user”); id. 2.2 (authorizing Google to make “Display Uses”); id. § 3.1 (“Google may, on a 
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would have paid $60 for each book that it had scanned, for a total of 
at least $45 million.56 Beyond that, the settlement would have 
authorized some new major uses of the scanned books. Google would 
have sold online access to individual e-books,57 and also offered an 
all-new all-you-can-read subscription service to libraries and other 
institutions.58 In addition, Google would have shown search users 
previews of up to 20% of each book.59 And finally, it would have 
created a “Research Corpus” for large-scale computational analyses 
of the texts by scholars.60 
Google would have kept 37% of the revenue;61 the rest would 
have been directed to a new Book Rights Registry for distribution to 
copyright owners who stepped forward to claim their books.62 Those 
who did claim their books could choose whether to include them in 
the various revenue-generating programs.63 The procedures for 
 
non-exclusive basis, Digitize all Books and Inserts obtained by Google from any source 
. . . .”). 
 56. See id. § 5.1(a) (defining “Cash Payments” as at least $60 per book); id. § 5.1(b) 
(requiring Google to contribute at least $45 million to fund Cash Payments); id. 
Attachment C (providing “Plan of Allocation” for payments among copyright owners). 
 57. See id. § 4.2 (establishing Consumer Purchase program). Google’s eBookstore is 
extremely similar to the proposed Consumer Purchase program under the settlement. See 
Books on Google Play, GOOGLE PLAY, https://play.google.com/store 
/books?feature=corpus_selector (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). The key difference is that books 
in the eBookstore are there with the explicit opt-in permission of copyright owners, 
whereas the settlement would have allowed Google to include books whose copyright 
owners had not affirmatively opted out. 
 58. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 4.1 (establishing Institutional 
Subscription program). Google would also have been permitted—although not required—
to give colleges and public libraries limited free access to the Institutional Subscription. 
See id. § 4.8 (authorizing Public Access service). 
 59. See id. § 4.3 (establishing Preview Use program); id. § 3.14 (allowing advertising 
on preview webpages). 
 60. See id. § 7.2(d); Brief for Digital Humanities and Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Defendant at 1–3, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y 
Aug. 3, 2012), ECF No. 1055. 
 61. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 4.5(a) (setting revenue split to be 
given to copyright owners at 70% of net revenues); id. §§ 1.89–1.90 (defining net revenues 
to exclude 10% for Google’s operating costs). 
 62. See id. art. VI (establishing Registry and defining its duties, which also included 
negotiating with Google over subscription pricing, auditing Google’s accounting, and 
negotiating with Google the terms of three additional uses: print-on-demand, 
downloadable copies (e.g. in PDF or EPUB format), and a subscription for individual 
consumers). 
 63. Class action scholars refer to these options as “back-end opt-out rights” to 
distinguish them from the right to opt out of the settlement itself. See, e.g., Nagareda, 
Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options, supra note 9, at 758; Rhonda Wasserman, The Curious 
Complications with Back-End Opt-Out Rights, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 383–84 
(2007). They are options available within the settlement itself to class members who are 
otherwise bound by its terms. See id. at 379. As with everything else in the Google Books 
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dividing the money and control of a book between authors and 
publishers were complex, requiring a separate sixteen-page 
attachment.64 Owners who did not claim their books would have been 
represented by an Unclaimed Works Fiduciary within the Registry,65 
which would have held their money for at least ten years, then given it 
to “literacy-based charities.”66 The settlement was immensely 
complicated; this overview describes only the terms directly relevant 
to its class-action bona fides.67 
 
settlement, their details were complicated. The settlement let class members irrevocably 
remove their books from being scanned at all, but only for a limited time. See Authors 
Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 3.5(a). It also gave them the option to exclude their 
books from being included in the revenue models or shown to users, an option they could 
toggle on or off at any time. See id. § 3.5(b). 
 64. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, Attachment C. 
 65. See id. § 6.2(b)(iii). Notwithstanding the name, the settlement did not actually 
require the Unclaimed Works Fiduciary to be vested with enforceable fiduciary duties. See 
Letter from Institution for Information Law and Policy at 2, Authors Guild, No. 05 Civ. 
8136, ECF No. 856. It was added to the settlement because of the conflict of interest 
inherent in having copyright owners who had claimed their books sharing in revenue 
meant for those who had not. See Statement of Interest I, supra note 54, at 9–10; James 
Grimmelmann, The Google Book Search Settlement: Ends, Means, and the Future of 
Books, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y (Apr. 15, 2009), https://www.acslaw.org 
/sites/default/files/Grimmelman_Issue_Brief.pdf. 
 66. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 6.3(a). 
 67. For discussion of the copyright issues the settlement raised, see generally 
Katharina de la Durantaye, H Is for Harmonization: The Google Book Search Settlement 
and Orphan Works Legislation in the European Union, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 157 (2010) 
(describing settlement’s role in advancing conversations about orphan works in the United 
States and in the European Union); Bernard Lang, Orphan Works and the Google Book 
Search Settlement: An International Perspective, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 111 (2010) 
(assessing settlement against limitations imposed by copyright treaty system); Lateef 
Mtima & Steven D. Jamar, Fulfilling the Copyright Social Justice Promise: Digitized 
Textual Information, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 77 (2010) (arguing that Google’s digitization 
of books advances the distributive goals of copyright law); Sag, supra note 47 (comparing 
the settlement to the hypothetical results of litigation); Samuelson, supra note 13 (arguing 
that the settlement could implement forms of copyright reform that Congress would likely 
not be able to pass). 
  For antitrust discussion, see generally Einer Elhauge, Why the Google Books 
Settlement Is Procompetitive, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2010) (arguing that the settlement is 
legal under antitrust law); Randal C. Picker, The Google Book Search Settlement: A New 
Orphan-Works Monopoly?, 5 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 383 (2009) (asserting that the opt-out 
provision could raise antitrust concerns); Yuan Ji, Note, Why the Google Book Search 
Settlement Should Be Approved: A Response to Antitrust Concerns and Suggestions for 
Regulation, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 231 (2011) (concluding that the settlement would 
not have granted exclusive orphan book access to Google or anticompetitive pricing 
power to the Rightsholders); Christopher A. Suarez, Note, Continued DOJ Oversight of 
the Google Book Search Settlement: Defending Our Public Values and Promoting 
Competition, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 175 (2010) (arguing that the settlement fails antitrust 
scrutiny). 
  On privacy issues, see generally Elisabeth A. Jones & Joseph W. Janes, 
Anonymity in a World of Google Books: Google Books, Privacy, and the Freedom to Read, 
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Returning to the settlement’s treatment of future conduct, the 
operative clause read: 
Without further action by anyone, as of the Effective Date, the 
Rightsholder Releasors . . . shall be deemed to have, and by 
operation of law and the Final Judgment and Order of 
Dismissal shall have, fully, finally, and forever released, 
relinquished, settled, and discharged (i) the Google Released 
Claims . . . .68 
In turn, the settlement defined “Google Released Claims” as 
each and every Claim of every Rightsholder that has been or 
could have been asserted in the Action against any Google 
Releasee (including all Claims of copyright infringement, 
trademark infringement, or moral rights violation) that arises 
out of 
(A) any of the following actions taken on or before the 
Effective Date . . . , 
(ii) any Google Releasee’s Digitization of such Books 
and Inserts and any Google Releasee’s use of Digital 
Copies of Books and Inserts for Google’s use in Google 
Products and Services . . . , 
(B) after the Effective Date, any act or omission authorized 
by this Amended Settlement Agreement . . . when that act 
or omission is undertaken by a Person who is authorized to 
undertake it under this Amended Settlement Agreement 
. . . .69 
 
POL’Y & INTERNET, no. 4, 2010, at 43, http://www.psocommons.org/cgi 
/viewcontent.cgi?article=1072&context=policyandinternet (teasing out the differences in 
reader privacy protections between public libraries and Google Books); Kathleen E. 
Kubis, Note, Google Books: Page by Page, Click by Click, Users Are Reading Away 
Privacy Rights, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 217 (2010) (proposing a comprehensive 
federal privacy statute). 
  For an overview of the relationships among these issues, see generally James 
Grimmelmann, The Elephantine Google Books Settlement, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
497 (2011) (connecting antitrust, copyright, and class-action concerns); Grimmelmann, The 
Google Book Search Settlement, supra note 65 (arguing that settlement raises significant 
concerns in multiple areas). 
 68. Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 10.2(a). 
 69. Id. § 10.1(f) (indentation added to show structure). A “Rightsholder” was defined 
as any person who owned a copyright in a book as of January 5, 2009. Id. §§ 1.13, 1.19, 
1.134. Thus, class membership was closed as of a certain date, and the set of books to 
which the settlement applied was also closed. In contrast, the set of claims released by 
these class members with respect to these books was open-ended, because it included 
future claims based on Google’s future conduct. Thus, the settlement reached future 
conduct, but not future authors or future books. To understand the difference, contrast a 
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This definition neatly split into two parts. Clause (A) covered 
past conduct: it released claims arising out of Google’s actions before 
the date the settlement was to take effect.70 Clause (B) covered future 
conduct: it released claims arising out of Google’s actions afterwards. 
Thus, if Google digitized a book the day before the Effective Date, it 
would have been past conduct shielded by clause (A); if Google 
digitized a book the day after the Effective Date, it would have been 
future conduct shielded by clause (B). 
The two prongs, past and future, had very different scopes. 
Clause (A) hewed closely to specific and identified actions that 
Google had already undertaken: digitizing books, making a search 
index, and showing snippets to search users.71 But clause (B) was 
much broader. It covered “any act or omission authorized” by the 
settlement.72 So to understand its scope, one must read the other 
hundred and forty pages of the settlement. Those pages included 
individual book sales, the subscription service, excerpts shown as free 
previews to users, computational research, and everything else the 
settlement allowed Google to do.73 If the settlement had been 
approved, then clause (A) would have resolved the underlying 
lawsuit, while clause (B) would have gone further and authorized 
Google’s universal bookstore. 
When the court rejected the settlement in March 2011, this 
distinction between past-conduct releases and future-conduct releases 
was central to its reasoning: 
 
book published in 2008 but not scanned by Google until 2108 with a book published and 
scanned in 2010. The former would have been covered by the settlement, and the latter 
would not. 
  It is unclear what effect the limiting phrase “every Claim . . . that . . . could have 
been asserted” was intended to have. Claims arising out of the controversial parts of the 
settlement—Google’s sales of complete books—could not have been asserted in the 
lawsuit, because they were not ripe. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 11 CV 
6351(HB), 2012 WL 4808939, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012) (holding that claims against 
Google’s library partners for distributing complete books were not ripe because a “ ‘mere 
possibility’ that one of Plaintiffs’ works might be included on a future list of orphan works 
or made available is not enough” to create a ripe dispute). But the entire settlement was 
premised on the assumption that it would indeed authorize the sale of complete books. 
The most likely possibilities are that the parties did not appreciate that these future-
conduct claims were unripe or that that the language of “claims that could have been 
asserted” is such standard boilerplate in settlements that they were reluctant to tamper 
with it. Neither possibility is reassuring about the competence of class counsel in future 
cases to draft effectively tailored future-conduct releases; see also infra Part V.A 
(discussing ripeness issues in litigation against Google and its library partners). 
 70. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 1.53 (defining “Effective Date”). 
 71. See id. § 10.1(f)(A). 
 72. See id. § 10.1(f)(B). 
 73. See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text. 
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  The [settlement] can be divided into two distinct parts. The 
first is a settlement of past conduct and would release Google 
from liability for past copyright infringement. The second 
would transfer to Google certain rights in exchange for future 
and ongoing arrangements, including the sharing of future 
proceeds, and it would release Google (and others) from 
liability for certain future acts.74 
According to the court, the future-conduct releases were 
impermissible: “this second part of the [settlement] contemplates an 
arrangement that exceeds what the Court may permit under Rule 
23.”75 
B.  Defining Future-Conduct Releases 
There are three features of this example worth emphasizing: 
•  The settlement used releases. 
•  The releases applied to future conduct. 
•  The releases were given by the class. 
The next three sections consider each of these features in turn. 
1.  Releases for Future Conduct Given by a Class 
Every settlement includes at least two kinds of terms: the releases 
of legal claims given by the plaintiff, and the relief it obtains in return. 
Typically, a plaintiff has nothing to fear from the relief—these terms 
can only benefit it. Thus, even though the Google Books settlement 
would have created a $34.5 million Book Rights Registry and given it 
numerous responsibilities, these were not reasons to be concerned.76 
Even relief involving far-off future action on the defendant’s part is 
common. Class-action settlements regularly establish claim-
processing facilities, fund educational programs, or even provide 
medical services to class members.77 Extinguishing asbestos claims in 
 
 74. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 75. Id. at 677. For the history of the lawsuit following the settlement’s rejection, see 
infra Part V.A. 
 76. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 2.1(c) (obligating Google to fund 
the Registry with an initial $34.5 million and summarizing its responsibilities). 
 77. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. 
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1203, No. 99-20593, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275, at *69–72, *79–82 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (approving settlement creating a trust to pay class members’ 
claims, providing free echocardiograms for class members, and establishing a $25 million 
fund for heart-disease medical research and education). The Diet Drugs fund, approved in 
2000, is still open. See generally AHP DIET DRUGS SETTLEMENT, http:// 
www.settlementdietdrugs.com (last visited Jan. 4, 2013) (providing information about Diet 
Drugs fund for class members). 
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bankruptcy requires the creation of a trust that may need to be kept 
open for decades.78 
Rather, it is the releases given by class members that make a 
settlement dangerous to them.79 (The same is true in individual 
settlements: a party is at risk because of what it gives up, not because 
of what it gets.) But because it is a release that makes a settlement a 
settlement, the mere fact that a settlement contains releases is not a 
reason to reject it. Every settlement does. The objectors who called 
the Google Books settlement a “commercial transaction” were wide 
of the mark.80 As William Rubenstein has observed, much of modern 
 
 78. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2006) (permitting a bankruptcy court approving a plan of 
reorganization in Chapter 11 to issue an injunction preventing future claims against a 
debtor “seeking recovery for damages allegedly caused by the presence of, or exposure to, 
asbestos or asbestos-containing products,” but only if the plan also establishes and funds a 
trust that “will value, and be in a financial position to pay, present claims and future 
demands that involve similar claims in substantially the same manner”). Section 524(g), 
the so-called “Manville Amendment,” was enacted in 1994 to bless and codify the 
procedure followed in the six-year journey through bankruptcy of the Johns-Manville 
Corporation. See generally Mark D. Plevin et. al., The Future Claims Representative in 
Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: Conflicts of Interest, Strange Alliances, and 
Unfamiliar Duties for Burdened Bankruptcy Clients, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 271, 
278–80 (2006) (providing an overview of how § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code deals with 
future claims in asbestos-related litigation). The original Manville Trust, established in 
1988, is still open. See Financial Statements and Report of Manville Personal Injury Trust 
for the Period Ending March 31, 2011, In re Johns-Manville Corporation, No. 82 B 11656 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2011), available at http://www.mantrust.org/FTP/2011FirstQ.pdf 
(reporting $1.06 billion in assets and over 20,000 open claims). 
 79. This Article focuses on releases because they are the most common kinds of 
concessions given by a plaintiff class. But this focus should not be taken to imply that 
other forms of concessions are harmless. When a class promises to pay money, or concedes 
liability, or makes promises, these terms also expose the class to harm. Indeed, there have 
been notorious abuses in which class members found themselves out of pocket at the end 
of the day. See, e.g., Kamilewicz v. Bank of Bos. Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 508–09 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(refusing to allow collateral attack on a class-action settlement that obligated class 
members to pay attorneys’ fees in excess of their recoveries). The case drew a strong 
dissent. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1349–53 (7th Cir. 
1996) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). But these other 
devices have generally been recognized as dangerous, and subjected to blistering criticism. 
See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 
1051, 1067–68 (1996) (criticizing underlying settlement in Kamilewicz). This Article seeks 
to bring the same kind of sunlight to future-conduct releases. 
 80. See Objection of Scott E. Gant to Proposed Settlement, and to Certification of the 
Proposed Settlement Class and Sub-Classes at 5, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. 
Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y 2011) (No. 05 CV 8136), ECF No. 141 (“commercial transaction”); 
Objection of Amazon.com, Inc., to Proposed Amended Settlement at 1, Authors Guild, 
770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 CV 8136), ECF No. 823 (“business arrangement”); Objections 
of Microsoft Corp. to proposed Settlement and Certification of Proposed Settlement Class 
and Sub-Classes at 22, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 CV 8136), ECF No. 276 
(“business deal”). 
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class-action practice is transactional.81 Class members sell their claims 
to the defendant in exchange for payment. The defendant wants to 
purchase finality, and the settlement process is simply an extended 
negotiation over the terms of the deal. The defendant might promise 
to change its behavior, or to pay class members money, or to 
undertake other obligations to make their lives better. The question 
for the court is whether they receive sufficient compensation for the 
releases they give.82 
2.  Releases for Future Conduct Given by a Class 
There are two distinctions about future-conduct releases worth 
making: between future conduct and past conduct, and between 
future conduct and future claims. Both can be illustrated with the 
hypothetical Warhol Soup example. Suppose that Batch 15M-1928, 
made and sold in 2010, was tainted with pathogenic E. coli. Contrast 
three possible settlements of a resulting class-action lawsuit: 
•  Consumers who have gotten sick from Batch 15M-1928 release 
their claims against Warhol in exchange for $50 payments. This 
is a settlement of present claims arising out of past conduct. 
Consumers who get sick in 2015 can still sue. 
•  Consumers who have gotten sick will get sick from Batch 15M-
1928 release their claims against Warhol in exchange for $50 
payments. This is a settlement of future claims arising out of 
past conduct. Consumers who get sick in 2015 from the delayed 
consequences of eating soup from Batch 15M-1928 cannot sue 
and must be content with the fixed $50 payments instead. 
Those who get sick in 2015 from eating other batches made in 
later years can sue. 
•  Consumers who have gotten sick will get sick from Batch 15M-
1928 future batches of Fifteen Minutes of Tomato release their 
claims against Warhol in exchange for $50 payments. This is a 
settlement of future claims arising out of future conduct. 
Consumers who get sick in 2015 cannot sue and must be 
content with the fixed $50 payments instead, no matter when 
the soup they ate was made. 
 
 
 81. See William Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 
372–73 (2001). 
 82. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (permitting approval of settlement only on a judicial 
finding that it “fair, reasonable, and adequate”). 
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Past-conduct releases are almost completely at the discretion of 
the party giving the release. Not so with future-conduct releases: 
sometimes, public policy prohibits them. So, for example, the 
Supreme Court has held that “there can be no prospective waiver of 
an employee’s rights under Title VII.”83 Of course, this limit applies 
also to settlements; if it did not, the civil rights laws could be evaded 
by the “settlement” of a collusive lawsuit.84 
This substantive rule against future-conduct releases is not 
universal: some areas of law have it, others do not. The key 
question—albeit one that is not made explicit in the case law—
appears to be whether the area of law has a public policy against 
private ordering. Anti-discrimination law obviously does: even if a 
particular individual were willing to be subjected to invidious 
discrimination, it would still be against public policy because it would 
 
 83. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974). 
 84. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 854 (5th Cir. 
1975) (“Clearly apart from compliance or noncompliance with the decrees, the release 
cannot preclude a suit for any form of appropriate relief for subsequent injuries caused by 
future acts or undertakings the effects of which are equivalent to the otherwise 
compromised, noncompensable effects of past discriminations covered by the complaint or 
the decrees.”); see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2006) (allowing knowing and voluntary 
waivers of age discrimination claims); id. § 626 (f)(1)(C) (prohibiting waivers of age 
discrimination claims “that may arise after the date the waiver is executed”). 
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tend to lock in a system of subordination and stereotyping that would 
harm others. So does antitrust law: its raison d’être is to prohibit 
forms of private ordering that have serious negative effects for 
competition and consumers.85 
Other areas of law do not have a substantive policy against 
future-conduct releases. Copyright law depends on voluntary 
licensing to compensate authors and get works to the public;86 a rule 
against future-conduct releases would make prospective licensing 
harder or impossible, to the great detriment of authors, publishers, 
and readers.87 Sometimes the analysis requires more detailed factual 
attention, as with the rule against prospective waivers of liability for 
harm caused negligently by “one charged with a duty of public 
service,” such as a doctor.88 
Although these public-policy limits sometimes emerge in class 
actions, they stem from the substantive law, not from the class-action 
form. A good example is Williams v. Vukovich,89 a case involving 
racial discrimination by the Youngstown police department.90 The 
court rejected a proposed consent decree91 that would have “waive[d] 
 
 85. See, e.g., Three Rivers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 896 n.27 (3d 
Cir. 1975) (stating that a release may not “waive damages from future violations of 
antitrust laws” and citing cases). 
 86. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (distinguishing “transfer of copyright ownership” 
from a “nonexclusive license”); id. §§ 112(e)(2) (exempting voluntary license negotiations 
over certain ephemeral recordings from the antitrust laws); id. § 205(e) (establishing 
priority as between nonexclusive licenses and transfers). 
 87. See Transcript of Fairness Hearing at 143, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05 
Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2010) (argument of Daralyn Durie on behalf of Google) 
(“That’s because discrimination is evil. The dissemination of copyrighted works is not. 
That is because the purpose of the Copyright Act is to encourage the production of 
copyrighted works.”). 
 88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1981). This example reflects a 
balance between a general backdrop of freedom of contract and more specific oversight of 
the regulated professions. See id. cmt. a. 
 89. 720 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 90. See id. at 912; see also Transcript of Fairness Hearing, supra note 87, at 48–49 
(argument of David Nimmer on behalf of Amazon.com, invoking Vukovich). 
 91. A consent decree is “an agreement between the parties to end a lawsuit on 
mutually acceptable terms which the judge agrees to enforce as a judgment.” Larry 
Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321, 325 
(1988). It differs from an ordinary civil settlement in that the court retains jurisdiction to 
enforce the agreement’s terms: the parties “can resolve disputes [about the settlement’s 
terms] and get enforcement without filing a new suit and starting at the end of the queue.” 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Consent in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
19, 20 (1987). It may be modified or vacated by the court due to changed circumstances. 
See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378–81 (1992). 
  Class-action settlements and consent decrees overlap. A class-action settlement 
may include provisions providing for ongoing relief; when it does, the agreement is both a 
class-action settlement and a consent decree. See, e.g., Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n. of 
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the ability of minorities to complain about discrimination which may 
occur in the future” by allowing the Youngstown police department 
to use a new examination system even if it had discriminatory 
impact.92 The court held that a “waiver of future discrimination is 
impermissible”: a rule that is specific to civil rights law, but not to 
class actions.93 
3.  Releases for Future Conduct Given by a Class 
Releases by classes are categorically different than releases by 
individuals.94 The legal system already leaves individuals to make 
their bargains, for good or for ill. Ordinary contracts are full of 
 
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1986). And like class-action 
settlements, consent decrees require judicial approval. See id. at 525 (“[A] consent decree 
must spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court's subject-matter 
jurisdiction.”); Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Emp. Dept. v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961) 
(“The parties cannot, by giving each other consideration, purchase from a court of equity a 
continuing injunction. . . . [T]he District Court's authority to adopt a consent decree comes 
only from the statute which the decree is intended to enforce. . . . [T]he adopting court is 
free to reject agreed-upon terms as not in furtherance of statutory objectives . . . .”). See 
generally Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 29 
B.C. L. REV. 291 (1988) (discussing contract and judicial decree paradigms of consent 
decrees). 
  Still, it is important to distinguish the different kinds of terms that may appear in a 
settlement. The essential aspect of a consent decree is that it is a decree: it invokes the 
court’s equitable powers, functions as injunctive relief, and can be enforced by holding the 
violator in contempt of court. United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 439–40 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (per curiam). Whether a class-action settlement includes any such provisions is 
independent of the scope of the releases it contains. See generally DOUG RENDLEMAN, 
COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT 399–
401 (2010) (discussing the theoretical and practical aspects of consent decrees). 
 92. Vukovich, 720 F.2d at 926. 
 93. Id. 
 94. This Article discusses only class actions, rather than other forms of nonclass 
aggregation, such as shared representation, coordinated pretrial processing, and mass 
arbitration. There are two reasons. First, a proper treatment of nonclass aggregation 
would greatly expand the scope of the Article. Second, the Article is principally concerned 
with the unjustified use of judicial power to impose terms on class members, a concern 
that plays out very differently when the aggregation shapes class members’ rights and 
options less directly. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in 
NonClass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2009) (developing theory of 
procedural justice for nonclass aggregation that draws on class-action scholarship); 
Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of 
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381 (2000) (developing 
theory of professional ethics for nonclass aggregation that draws on class-action 
scholarship); Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 1105 (2010) (identifying situations raising aggregate-litigation 
concerns); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011) (describing 
common aggregation problems in class actions and nonclass litigation). 
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releases for present and future claims based on past and future 
conduct, as in the warranties section of a contract for the sale of 
services. The same autonomy principle that lets Adam sign a contract 
hiring Steve to cut down trees on Adam’s land also lets Adam release 
Steve from liability for trespass and conversion when Steve cuts them 
down. If Adam wants to give Steve those releases as part of a 
settlement of an active lawsuit, the legal system will let him: it has 
already conceded the general principle. 
But class litigation is inherently representational, and that 
changes matters.95 Here, there is no contractual parallel: we do not 
ordinarily allow lawyers to go around signing contracts on behalf of 
large classes of individuals. Instead, the only way to obtain a release 
from a class is in a settlement—that is, by invoking the court’s power 
to impose a settlement on absent members of the class.96 This 
requires justification in a way that individual releases do not. We let 
individuals make improvident decisions on their own behalf; but we 
try not to let class counsel make improvident decisions on behalf of 
class members. 
What matters is the character of the release, not the character of 
the lawsuit. The fact that an individual gives a promise to a class as 
part of a class-action settlement is of no moment. It is still 
fundamentally an individual promise, and does not raise the 
representational concerns that releases given by a class do. 
Cases sometimes speak broadly about class-action settlements 
that “provide[] broader relief than the court could have awarded after 
a trial.”97 Uniformly, however, these cases deal with broad relief given 
 
 95. See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO 
THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987) (discussing history of representative litigation); 
Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of 
Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1990) (reviewing YEAZELL) (same); 
Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for Aggregate 
Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577 (2011) (challenging 
contemporary theories of representation). 
 96. This is the defining feature of representational litigation—that the judgment will 
be binding on “absent” class members who were not before the court. See, e.g., Supreme 
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921) (“If the federal courts are to have 
the jurisdiction in class suits to which they are obviously entitled, the decree when 
rendered must bind all of the class properly represented.”). Articles with useful discussion 
of representation in class actions include Bone, The Puzzling Idea, supra note 95, at 577; 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., John L. Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of the 
Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1857 (1998); Richard A. Nagareda, 
The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 
224 (2003). 
 97. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179, 185 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting 
Local No. 93, Int’l Assoc. of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986)). 
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to the class rather than with broad releases given by the class. For 
example, in Local No. 93, International Association of Firefighters v. 
Cleveland,98 minority firefighters sued Cleveland for racial 
discrimination.99 The city agreed to a consent decree that reserved 
some promotions for minorities.100 A group of white firefighters 
intervened and objected to the consent decree, alleging that it went 
beyond the lawsuit by giving promotions to minorities who had not 
themselves been the victims of racial discrimination.101 The Supreme 
Court upheld the consent decree, explaining: 
However, in addition to the law which forms the basis of the 
claim, the parties’ consent animates the legal force of a consent 
decree. Therefore, a federal court is not necessarily barred from 
entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides 
broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial.102 
The allegedly problematic relief in Firefighters was a promise 
made by the individual party (Cleveland) and not the class (the 
minority firefighters). And while the white firefighters may have 
disagreed with the consent decree, they were not parties who would 
be bound by its releases.103 Their problem was that they had no legal 
right to stop Cleveland’s new promotion plan, not that they might 
have had such a right and were being forced to trade it away. 
Firefighters simply has nothing to say about the permissible scope of 
releases given by the class in a Rule 23(e) review: it speaks of “relief” 
to the plaintiffs, not the “releases” given by the plaintiffs.104 This is 
why the cases offering “detailed structural arrangements addressing 
matters well beyond the generalized allegations of the complaint” are 
simply not relevant to future-conduct releases by a class.105 Similarly, 
the recent ALI Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation state, 
“Class actions may also be settled on terms that may include remedies 
 
 98. 478 U.S. 501, 504 (1986). 
 99. Id. at 504. 
 100. Id. at 507–08. 
 101. Id. at 507, 511. 
 102. Id. at 525 (internal citations omitted). 
 103. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989). 
 104. See Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 504. The Authors Guild court therefore erred when it 
accepted the parties’ arguments that the Firefighters test governed. See Authors Guild v. 
Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 675 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). It compensated for that error, 
however, by concluding that the test was not satisfied, writing that “that the released 
claims would not come within ‘the general scope of the case made by the pleadings.’ ” Id. 
at 679 (quoting Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 525). 
 105. Brief of Google in Support, supra note 36, at 9 (listing cases). 
CITE AS 91 N.C. L. REV. 387 (2012) 
2013] CLASS-ACTION SETTLEMENTS 415 
 
not available in contested lawsuits . . . .”106 The choice of wording is 
significant: the court may award “remedies” not available through 
litigation, not “releases.” 
* * * 
Standing alone, none of these three features is novel. Courts and 
scholars understand clearly the differences between promises and 
releases, between past conduct and future conduct, and between 
individual and class litigation. Even in pairs, they are all old hat. It is 
only the combination of the three that is unfamiliar: releases for a 
defendant’s future conduct by a class. 
II.  PROBLEMS WITH FUTURE-CONDUCT RELEASES 
It is well understood that class-action settlements are dangerous 
to class members. The attorney-directed nature of class litigation 
creates structural incentives for class counsel to be disloyal to their 
“clients” in the class.107 The settlement negotiations feature the 
defendant on one side and class counsel on the other. The defendant 
would like to purchase “global peace” from the class and is prepared 
to pay for it. The broader the releases, the more it will pay. Class 
counsel, for their part, are paid in proportion to the size of the deal. 
This common interest naturally pushes toward settlements with the 
 
 106. THE AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
§ 3.01(a) (2010). 
 107. See, e.g., LESTER BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT THEIR CONTINGENCY 
FEES REALLY COST AMERICA 335–73 (2011) (discussing the abuse of contingency fees in 
class actions); Coffee, supra note 9, at 1367–84 (describing incentives for class counsel in 
the mass tort context and the resulting danger of collusion with the defendant); Koniak, 
supra note 9, at 1051–86 (describing in detail the problematic terms in one settlement); cf. 
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852 (1999) (“Class counsel thus had great 
incentive to reach any agreement in the global settlement negotiations that they thought 
might survive a Rule 23(e) fairness hearing, rather than the best possible arrangement for 
the substantially unidentified global settlement class.”). For a discussion of possible 
responses to this problem, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: 
Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 
(2000) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Action Accountability] (arguing that problems of 
collusion could be avoided by promoting client autonomy rather than class cohesion); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 288 (2010) (extending argument of Class Action Accountability with evidence and 
models from European practice); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and 
“Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1377 (2000) (arguing that problems of abusive class actions can be solved without 
abandoning the device); Issacharoff, supra note 9 (discussing class governance mechanisms 
to temper the risks of ineffective or disloyal class counsel); Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental 
Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65 (2003) (same); William B. 
Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 1435 (2006) (same); Wolfman & Morrison, supra note 9 (same). 
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broadest possible releases. Meanwhile, both defendant and class 
counsel would rather sign off on a settlement that pays class counsel a 
little than one that pays class members a lot. This leads to settlements 
that “pay” for broad releases in coin that does not really benefit class 
members, such as coupons worth less than their nominal value, “cy 
pres” awards to unrelated charities, side payments to the attorneys’ 
individual clients outside of the settlement, and better relief for some 
class members than for others. The possibility, nay probability, of 
collusive sweetheart settlements drives the Rule 23(e)(2) requirement 
that courts approve only those settlements that are “fair, reasonable, 
and adequate.”108 
With this backdrop in mind, this Part will compare future-
conduct settlements to their past-conduct siblings. The baseline for 
the comparison will be a run-of-the-mill settlement of a Rule 23(b)(3) 
class action for money damages,109 as in the first (past conduct, past 
 
 108. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 109. This choice could be challenged on two grounds. First, it takes a plaintiff class 
action as the baseline, although Rule 23 explicitly permits a class to “sue or be sued.” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23(a). Defendant class actions are “rare as unicorns,” and with good reason. 
Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 107 at 388. Because a defendant class (or a 
plaintiff class facing counterclaims) risks actual liability, not just the loss of a right to sue, it 
presents the higher-stakes concerns discussed in infra Part II.A. And there have been 
notorious abuses of defendant class-actions due to the practical difficulty of finding 
appropriate class representatives and financing their work. See, e.g., Richardson v. Kelly, 
191 S.W.2d 857, 864 (Tex. 1946) (refusing to allow collateral attack on a judgment in a 
defendant class action where the plaintiff had hand-picked representative defendants to 
avoid those who were likely to seriously contest the suit). Richardson involved a case 
litigated to judgment rather than settled, but it illustrates well the mischief that is possible 
when class representatives can obligate class members to make payments. See 
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 239–42 (1950) (criticizing 
Richardson); Russell P. Duncan, Note, Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Duty: W.R. 
Grace & Co. v. CAB, 55 YALE L.J. 831, 836 (1946) (calling Richardson “unfair”); Harold 
Hoffman, Comment, Denial of Due Process Through Use of the Class Action, 25 TEX. L. 
REV. 64 passim (1946) (discussing Richardson). For these reasons, “stricter due process 
considerations put greater limits on the use of defendant classes than plaintiff classes.” 2 
ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:48 (4th ed. 
2011). Thus, courts have already responded to the ways in which defendant class actions 
deviate from the plaintiff-class baseline by imposing additional safeguards, confirming that 
the plaintiff-class baseline is the appropriate one. 
  Second, the Article takes a rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class as its baseline, rather than a 
mandatory class under subsections (b)(1) or (b)(2). Here the choice is primarily one of 
expository simplicity. The claims that could be extinguished and the issues that could be 
resolved in a mandatory class action do not exceed those at stake in a Rule 23(b)(3) class 
action. The prerequisites to the mandatory class actions do not create new opportunities 
for abuse, and the question of notice and opt-out rights is for the most part independent of 
the question of future conduct. The one exception is that Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 
472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985) creates a link between opt-out rights and the risks a class faces in 
litigation. See also infra Part III (discussing Shutts). 
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claims) and second (past conduct, future claims) versions of the 
Warhol Soup hypothetical.110 The risks of future-conduct releases to 
class members are substantially greater than the risks of past-conduct 
releases, so that they require correspondingly greater scrutiny by 
courts. These heightened risks are driven by the basic asymmetry 
between past and future. The past can be known but not changed, 
whereas the future can be changed but not known. Thus, the 
consequences of future-conduct releases will tend to be both more 
far-reaching and harder to predict. 
It is worth exploring just how it is that releases can be so 
uniquely creative. A promise not to sue is effectively a grant of 
permission, which in turn gives the released party freedom of action. 
Consider the Google Books settlement, and ask how it is that a one-
paragraph release could bring a universal bookstore into being. 
Without the releases, the settlement’s principal programs—selling 
complete copies of books—would have been open-and-shut copyright 
infringement. This is how the settlement works: delete clause (B) 
from the definition of Google Released Claims and Google would 
lack the legal cover it needs. True, the settlement also obligated 
Google to fund and launch the bookstore, but the bookstore would 
have been legally possible only by virtue of the releases given by class 
members.111 
It should be clear that one can do a remarkable amount with 
appropriately drafted releases. Here are a few more ambitious 
possibilities: 
Alternative Tort Compensation: Following the Deepwater 
Horizon explosion, BP voluntarily created the Gulf Coast Claims 
Facility (GCCF); those injured by the oil spill could make claims by 
giving up their right to sue.112 But with future-conduct releases and a 
 
 110. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 111. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, §§ 2.1(c), 10.1(b). Even more 
dramatically, the authors and publishers would have been required to give extensive 
releases to each other, the effect of which would have been to allocate the revenues from 
any given book among possible claimants in a way that need not track the original 
contract, and then to channel them into a mandatory arbitration program for resolving any 
disputes. See id. art. IX (requiring arbitration) & Attachment A (establishing author-
publisher procedures); Objections of Science Fiction & Fantasy Writers of America, Inc., 
& American Society of Journalists & Authors, Inc., to the Amended Settlement 
Agreement at 16–22, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(No. 1:05-cv-08136-DC), ECF No. 864. 
 112. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims 
Facility as a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819, 
825 (2011) (“[I]t is difficult to discern any basis for legitimacy for the GCCF. For those 
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little forethought, BP could have achieved the same results far more 
cheaply. Suppose that following an earlier, minor spill, BP had faced a 
class-action lawsuit on behalf of all residents of the Gulf States. Then 
suppose it had settled that lawsuit with a future-conduct release 
shielding it from liability for any future spills, in exchange for 
establishing a $1 billion compensation fund, against which all future 
claims must be directed.113 
Land Assembly: A developer wishing to build a skyscraper on a 
currently occupied city block brings a quiet title suit against a class of 
all the landowners on the block. The class representative and 
developer then negotiate a mandatory, non-opt-out settlement that 
will pay each class member 105% of the appraised value of her land 
in exchange for a release of any right to sue the developer for its 
actions in knocking down the current buildings on the block, erecting 
the skyscraper, and operating it for the next seventy-five years. This is 
privatized eminent domain via class-action settlement. 
Health Care Reform: A class of policyholders sues all the major 
healthcare insurers in the United States, alleging a conspiracy to fix 
prices. Over time, the settlement negotiations metastasize, and what 
emerges is a proposed settlement that comprehensively establishes 
new rules on reimbursement limits, acceptable grounds for rescission, 
claims processing procedures, choice of doctors, and so on. The 
insurers agree to these new terms; the policyholders agree to give up 
all future claims except for violation of the new terms. This is the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, but accomplished 
through a class-action settlement.114 
These hypothetical settlements are problematic in ways that go 
beyond their use of future-conduct releases. The oil-spill settlement, 
for example, raises serious commonality issues in lumping together 
victims injured in different ways by different spills. The land assembly 
settlement might be considered fundamentally unfair because it 
coerces a sale. And the health-care reform settlement calls into the 
question the ability of the named plaintiffs to represent such a 
 
concerned with the rule of law, equity, and fundamental fairness, the GCCF ought to be a 
cause for concern.”). 
 113. This amount, while large enough to seem plausible ex ante, would have been 
grossly inadequate ex post. GCCF actually paid out over two billion dollars. See GULF 
COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, OVERALL PROGRAM STATISTICS 4 (Oct. 7, 2011), http:// 
web.archive.org/web/20101216023532/http://gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/GCCF_Overall_St
atus_Report.pdf. 
 114. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (“PPACA”) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). This 
hypothetical was suggested by Susan Koniak. 
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sprawling class on such a wide range of matters. One hopes that a 
court would be sensitive to these issues. But the fact that these 
hypothetical future-conduct settlements make even the most 
ambitious (and ethically problematic) actual class-action settlements 
look downright reasonable in comparison should be setting off 
alarms. 
The rest of this Part will explore the specific dangers posed by 
future-conduct releases. To summarize: there is more at stake in 
future-conduct releases, they are harder to understand, they create 
unique design problems, the aggregation of rights is itself dangerous, 
and courts are the wrong institutions to be making such decisions. 
A.  High Stakes 
In the past-conduct version of the Warhol Soup settlement, the 
soup has already been manufactured, sold, and eaten. This is both bad 
news and good news for consumers. The bad news is that the legal 
system cannot keep them from getting sick; the good news is that the 
legal system cannot make them any sicker. The status quo is that they 
have been injured and have not yet been compensated. In the best 
case they will be fully compensated and in the worst case they will 
not—but only compensation is at risk, not the extent of their injuries. 
While past-conduct releases are limited by past harms, future-
conduct releases raise the stakes to include future harms as well. 
These harms need never happen. If the soup settlement releases 
Warhol Soup from liability for future batches of soup, many more 
people may get sick than if the settlement is silent on future conduct 
or if Warhol agrees never to sell it again. A past-conduct settlement 
of the Google Books case would cover eight years; a future-conduct 
settlement would run for over a hundred. The breathtaking ambition 
of the hypothetical oil-spill, skyscraper, and health-care settlements is 
possible only because of their use of future-conduct releases. 
Put another way, the potential outcomes can display much higher 
variance when class-action settlements can include future-conduct 
releases, and some outcomes are much more negative for class 
members. At least with a past-conduct settlement, the outcomes are 
bounded below by the status quo; not so with a future-conduct 
settlement. Higher variance, of course, need not imply lower expected 
returns. If class members are fully compensated for the increased risk 
of harm they bear, a settlement containing future-conduct releases 
could in theory be good for them. Unfortunately, there are also good 
reasons to believe that courts will systematically get many of these 
decisions wrong. 
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B.  Uncertainty 
As the saying goes, it’s tough to make predictions, especially 
about the future. Future-conduct releases by their very nature require 
predictions. The attorneys drafting the settlement, the class members 
considering whether to opt out or object to it, and the court deciding 
whether to approve it all must do so from a position of ignorance 
about what will happen. That is, the procedural posture of a 
settlement containing future-conduct releases inherently creates 
informational problems. 
Of course, even past-conduct settlements can depend on 
predictions. This is why the future-claims cases are so vexing. 
Knowing whether a settlement will be fair to someone who might or 
might not develop cancer is much harder than knowing whether that 
settlement is fair to someone who has developed cancer.115 Seemingly 
“comprehensive” settlements in mass-tort cases have unraveled 
badly: initial estimates about the ultimate number and extent of class 
members’ injuries have frequently proven to be far too optimistic.116 
Future-conduct settlements take these informational problems to 
an entirely different level. The court must now predict the 
consequences not of events that have already happened, but of events 
that have yet to happen. These are predictions about the results of 
predicted conduct: predictions on stilts. The defendant’s conduct 
becomes a new moving part. Each option to act in one way or another 
creates a new set of possible outcomes the court must analyze; as the 
number of independent decisions the defendant is allowed increases, 
the number of outcomes increases exponentially. The more complex 
the settlement, the more the possible futures will diverge in subtle 
and hard-to-predict ways. Courts are spectacularly badly positioned 
to carry out the necessary analysis. In the words of Samuel Issacharoff 
on class-action settlements, “Perhaps in no other context do we find 
courts entering binding decrees with such a complete lack of access to 
 
 115. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (discussing 
difficulty of giving adequate notice “to legions so unselfconscious”); Hazard, supra note 9, 
at 1910 (discussing intractability of “unknown claims on the part of unknown claimants”). 
 116. See, e.g., RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 
111–13 (2007) (describing the unraveling of Owens-Corning asbestos settlement program); 
id. at 143–48 (describing unraveling of fen-phen settlement); Frank J. Macchiarola, The 
Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust: Lessons for the Future, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 
583, 601–05 (1996) (describing the unraveling of the Johns-Manville asbestos trust). 
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quality information and so completely dependent on the parties who 
have the most to gain from favorable court action.”117 
For example, one of the least knowable questions about the 
Google Books settlement was also one of the most important: how 
the books would be priced. For individual book sales, Google pledged 
to develop an algorithm that would set a profit-maximizing price for 
each book.118 But the algorithm itself was not in existence: it was 
specified only by a few vague and mutually inconsistent phrases in the 
settlement.119 Similarly, the subscription service was to be priced to 
meet two objectives in significant tension: “revenue at market rates” 
for copyright owners and “broad access” for the public.120 Under such 
circumstances, it was impossible to make any reliable predictions 
about how books would be priced if the settlement went into effect—
and yet such predictions were key to answering such basic questions 
as whether the settlement would bring in enough money to make the 
Registry sustainable, whether the subscription’s pricing would 
unreasonably put the squeeze on libraries, and whether the 
coordinated pricing would amount to an anti-competitive price-fixing 
scheme. 
 
 117. Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 808 
(1997); cf. Schuck, supra note 9, at 973 (calling adjudication a “poorly informed 
decisionmaking process” with limited “policy coherence and general applicability”). 
 118. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 4.2(b)(i)(2) (indicating that the 
price is to be determined by an algorithm “that Google will design to find the optimal 
price for each such Book”); id. § 4.2(c)(i) (specifying price points). Here is the 
specification of the algorithm itself: 
The Pricing Algorithm shall base the Settlement Controlled Price of a Book, on an 
individual Book by Book basis, upon aggregate data collected with respect to 
Books that are similar to such Book and will be designed to operate in a manner 
that simulates how an individual Book would be priced by a Rightsholder of that 
Book acting in a manner to optimize revenues in respect of such Book in a 
competitive market, that is, assuming no change in the price of any other Book. 
Id. § 4.2(c)(ii)(2); see also Elhauge, supra note 67, at 37–38 (admitting that the original 
settlement’s specification was ambiguous and giving interpretation of amended 
settlement’s specification). 
 119. See Letter from Institution for Information Law and Policy, supra note 65, at 5 
(noting contradiction between settlement’s mandate to find the individually optimal price 
for each book and its specification of the initial distribution of prices). 
 120. Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 4.1(a)(i); see also Academic Author 
Objections to the Google Book Search Settlement at 3–5, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 
770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 1:05-cv-08136-DC), ECF No. 336 [hereinafter 
Academic Author Objections] (expressing concern about lack of constraints on 
subscription pricing and describing pricing oversight procedures as “byzantine, even 
Kafkaesque”). 
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Similarly, unpredictability is one of the significant problems in 
the health-care hypothetical. The U.S. health-care compensation 
system is already so intricate that it displays unexpected emergent 
behavior, and no one has more than a general idea of what 
consequences the Affordable Care Act will bring. If the Act were a 
settlement, would it be “fair, reasonable, and adequate” to patients? 
Are you sure? 
C.  Moral Hazard 
Future-conduct releases are also hard to get right because the 
future can be changed. A badly designed future-conduct release can 
create perverse incentives. Releasing a past-conduct claim affects only 
the price the defendant must pay ex post for its alleged breach of 
duty. But to release future-conduct claims is to tamper with 
incentives. By displacing the potential liability the defendant would 
otherwise face, a settlement can leave the defendant with less ex ante 
reason to care about harms it could still prevent. Some such issues 
will arise in any settlement with forward-looking terms, but with 
future-conduct releases, the moral hazard can infect the defendant’s 
primary conduct, not just the compensation. 
In theoretical terms, scholars worry about calibrating the 
deterrent effect of class actions: defendants (primarily companies) 
will vary their level of risky activities in light of the expected liability 
they face from class actions.121 For class actions over past conduct, this 
 
 121. The leading deterrence theorist is David Rosenberg. See generally Rosenberg, 
supra note 9 (arguing that an insurance fund model of class action judgment incorporates 
both deterrent and insurance functions of mass tort liability); David Rosenberg, 
Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 831 (2002) (arguing that mandatory class action litigation is the only means of 
effective deterrence); David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have 
and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 395 (2000) (“[D]ifferential access to the 
scale economies from class-wide litigation undermines the primary goals of tort law: 
effective and administratively efficient deterrence . . . .”); David Rosenberg, The Causal 
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 849 (1984) (arguing that preclusion of mass tort claims frustrates the deterrence 
goal of the tort system). But he is hardly alone in emphasizing the deterrence function. 
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 
51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1309–12 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class 
Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1536 
(2006); Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and 
Conflicts of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 49 (1975); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, 
Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial 
Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 106 (2006); Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: 
The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. 
L. REV. 1249, 1312–17 (2003); Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification 
and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1417 (2003). The approach has a long history. See 
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is a form of general deterrence: it aims to ensure that other potential 
defendants in similar situations will take adequate precautions. When 
future-conduct releases are involved, however, one must also worry 
about specific deterrence because the settlement will directly affect 
this particular defendant’s incentives going forward.122 This is a more 
complicated challenge, and harder to get right. 
This is of course the principal danger in the oil-spill 
hypothetical.123 If the terms of the compensation fund are not 
properly calibrated, then BP may find it profitable to take fewer 
precautions than would be socially optimal, or than the tort system 
would have required. Indeed, if the fund is established with a one-
time payment, it will give the company no incentive at all to care 
about future safety! 
The Google Books settlement also illustrates the challenges 
involved. The pricing and auditing provisions were both vague and 
complex.124 It was not immediately obvious what Google’s pricing 
incentives were, or what the Registry’s incentives to monitor Google 
were. If the prices had been set too high, Google could have been the 
agent of a conspiracy in restraint of trade.125 If the prices had been set 
too low, Google could have flooded the market with cheap copies and 
destroyed the books’ future value to copyright owners.126 Similarly, 
there was a telling mistake in the original settlement’s protections for 
owners of unclaimed works. The settlement reallocated some of the 
unclaimed funds to copyright owners who did claim their books, 
 
Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 
U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 714 (1940). 
 122. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (discussing 
broadly the roles of specific and general deterrence in accident law). This use of the terms 
is consistent with Calabresi’s distinction between directly prohibiting particular acts 
(specific deterrence) and putting costs on those whose activities cause them (general 
deterrence). See id. at 68–77. It is also consistent with the usual criminal-law senses of the 
terms: specific deterrence targets the individual, general deterrence targets others in the 
same shoes. 
 123. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
 124. The pricing provisions have already been discussed. On the auditing provisions, 
see Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, §§ 4.2(c)(ii)(3), 4.2(c)(iii), 4.6(e). 
 125. See Suarez, supra note 67, at 190–213 (arguing that there is a risk of 
anticompetitive pricing); Academic Author Objections, supra note 120, at 3 (discussing 
risks of “price-gouging”). But see Elhauge, supra note 67, passim (arguing in detail that 
Google’s incentives would have been socially optimal and that copyright owners 
themselves would have monitored it). 
 126. Cf. Letter from Institution for Information Law and Policy, supra note 65, at 3 
(noting lack of oversight for underpriced unclaimed books). 
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giving the claiming owners an incentive to pressure the Registry not 
to be diligent in searching out owners of unclaimed works.127 
D.  Concentrated Power 
The defining feature of class-wide future-conduct releases is that 
they give the defendant prospective freedom to act in a way that 
affects large numbers of class members at once.128 This is a form of 
power, and it can sometimes be turned around against class members. 
For example, concentrated power is the great danger in the 
healthcare reform settlement hypothetical. The settlement could 
provide the legal cover to cartelize the defendant insurers, freeing 
them from public oversight and market discipline.129 Patient class 
members could end up being practically helpless against the 
negotiating power of the new settlement-produced insurer cartel: 
 
 127. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, § 6.3(a) (providing for allocation of 
unclaimed funds); Statement of Interest I, supra note 54, at 9 (criticizing allocation); Brief 
of Amicus Curiae Institute for Information Law and Policy at 16, Authors Guild, 770 F. 
Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 239 (same). 
 128. In familiar Hohfeldian terms, a future-conduct release is the exercise of a power 
to relinquish a right held by the releasor, so that the releasee’s duty becomes a privilege. 
See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30–33 (1913) (presenting schema for the 
consistent use of terminology to describe bilateral legal relationships). In less familiar 
Hohfeldian terms, the class action transforms a paucital relationship between class 
members (defined by “a unique right residing in a person . . . and availing against a single 
person . . . or else . . . one of a few fundamentally similar, yet separate rights, availing . . . 
against a few definite persons”) into a multital relationship (defined by “a large class of 
fundamentally similar yet separate rights, actual and potential, residing in a single person 
. . . but availing respectively against persons constituting a very large and indefinite class of 
people”). Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 718 (1916). See generally Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 780–89 (2001) 
(reviving and extending Hohfeld’s paucital/multital distinction). The point of the 
distinction, for Hohfeld and for Merrill and Smith, is that it marks the boundary between 
contract/in personam rights and property/in rem rights. Thus, another way of 
understanding the effect of class-wide future-conduct releases is that they put property 
rights in play, not just individual obligations. Cf. James Grimmelmann, The Amended 
Google Books Settlement Is Still Exclusive, CPI ANTITRUST J. passim (Jan. 26, 2010), 
available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/the-amended-google-books-
settlement-is-still-exclusive (expressing concern that settlement would give Google de 
facto exclusive control over orphan works). 
 129. Cf. Picker, supra note 67, at 406–07 (expressing concern that the settlement 
process would be used to claim immunity from future antitrust scrutiny under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine). The amended settlement specifically responded to Picker’s concern 
by adding what Picker called a “no Noerr” clause. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra 
note 2, Attachment L, ¶ 17 (“This Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal is not intended 
to and does not provide any antitrust immunities to any Persons or parties.”). 
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precisely the opposite of what the original class action was supposed 
to accomplish. 
The key here is that more is different. The settlement can bestow 
collective advantages on the defendant that go beyond the sum of the 
individual releases it obtains. Centralizing all of these rights in one 
party gives it concentrated power. Sometimes, centralization can be a 
good thing, particularly in overcoming anticommons problems.130 
This, for example, might make the hypothetical skyscraper settlement 
attractive in avoiding hold-up by holdouts.131 
Some anticommons, however, are good things. As the skyscraper 
hypothetical also illustrates, there are countervailing reasons why we 
ordinarily want to make involuntary land assembly hard, 
notwithstanding the risk of foregoing a parcel’s highest and best use. 
Widely dispersed property rights protect individual autonomy, 
diverse values, and healthy communities.132 Dispersed ownership can 
also serve social goals by making it hard to engage in undesirable 
uses, like the overdevelopment of greenfield land.133 Widely dispersed 
power makes markets work; they break down when a monopolist 
holds too much power in a market. And dispersed power is central to 
democracy; if a small elite holds all the cards, self-governance breaks 
down.134 
It gets worse. We ordinarily think of class-action lawsuits as 
implicating only the rights of class members and defendants.135 When 
 
 130. See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH 
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 182–85 (2008) 
(discussing anticommons problems); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: 
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 667–73 (1998) 
(introducing anticommons theory). 
 131. Cf. D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation 5, 48–
66 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 
12–42, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2122877 
(arguing for class-action and non-class-aggregation procedures designed to allow class 
members to “bundle claims and thus capture the surplus that would otherwise go 
unrealized” by avoiding holdout problems). 
 132. See generally Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 917, 927–32 (2010) (synthesizing scholarship on use of property law to 
promote human flourishing, virtue, freedom, and democracy). 
 133. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 1, 32–37 (2003). 
 134. See Grimmelmann, The Elephantine Google Books Settlement, supra note 67, at 
517–19 (discussing linked concentration-of-power concerns in the Google Books 
settlement). 
 135. Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphatically insisted that non-parties to a suit are 
not generally bound by a judgment. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008) 
(rejecting theory of virtual representation); Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate 
Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 198–203 (2009) (discussing Taylor). Even in a class action, 
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a class-action settlement grants rights to the defendant that involve its 
future conduct, however, the settlement may practically determine 
the rights and interests of third parties—even though they are not 
formally bound to its terms. Consider again the healthcare insurance 
settlement hypothetical. Doctors were not defendants or members of 
the class. But if the settlement excluded all reimbursement for cardiac 
stents and required approval of two referring physicians before 
paying for visits to dermatologists, then cardiologists and 
dermatologists could reasonably object that the settlement would 
effectively preclude their rights. 
The antitrust objections to the Google Books settlement reflect 
these concerns. The accumulation of pricing power in Google and the 
Registry would have created a market-dominant player at the stroke 
of a pen.136 Google’s competitors feared that it would leapfrog to a 
position of unfair advantage;137 libraries and academics feared that 
 
parties are not generally bound unless they are actually made members of the class. See 
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989). The specific result in Martin was reversed by 
statute, see Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102–166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(n) (2006)), but the general principle remains. 
 136. In addition to the fact that the settlement itself was being used as a coordinated 
license grant by competitors in the book market, Google would have had de facto 
exclusivity as to orphan works, and the institutional subscription would have been a 
product with no close substitutes. 
 137. The Authors Guild opinion discusses antitrust issues, but only briefly. See Authors 
Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 682–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). More extensive 
discussion can be found in the filings. See Objection of Amazon.com, Inc., to Proposed 
Amended Settlement at 10–21, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), 
ECF No. 823; Objection of Amazon.com, Inc., to Proposed Settlement at 15–31, Authors 
Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 206; Objection to Class Action 
Settlement and Notice of Intent to Appear on Behalf of Class Members AT&T Corp. and 
Affiliates at 12–21, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 863; 
Objections of Microsoft Corp. to Proposed Amended Settlement and Certification of 
Proposed Settlement Class and Sub-Classes at 15–25, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 
(No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 874; Statement of Interest II, supra note 11, at 16–23; 
Statement of Interest I, supra note 54, at 16–26; Objection of Yahoo! Inc. to Final 
Approval of the Proposed Class Action Settlement at 21–26, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 
2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 288; Brief Amicus Curiae of Consumer Watchdog in 
Opposition to the Proposed Settlement Agreement at 18–22, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 
2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 263; Supplemental Memorandum of Amicus Curiae 
Open Book Alliance in Opposition to the Proposed Settlement Between the Authors 
Guild, Inc., Association of American Publishers, Inc., et al., and Google Inc. passim, 
Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 840; Memorandum of 
Amicus Curiae Open Book Alliance in Opposition to the Proposed Settlement Between 
the Authors Guild, Inc., Association of American Publishers, Inc., et al., and Google Inc. 
passim, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No 282. But see 
Elhauge, supra note 67, passim (offering spirited and detailed antitrust defense of the 
settlement); Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum Responding to Specific Objections at 
138–54, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 955; Brief of 
Google, Inc. in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement 
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Google would use its judicially granted exclusivity to price the must-
have subscription service extortionately.138 The fear of concentrated 
power is also clearly at work in objections that the Google Books 
settlement would have led to the loss of reader privacy.139 Google’s 
privacy policies are one thing if it is one bookseller among many in a 
crowded market, but quite another if Google is the only source for 
millions of orphan books. 
E.  Separation of Powers 
Future-conduct settlements can make prospective changes 
affecting large numbers of people in complex ways. This is the 
province of legislation and rulemaking.140 For reasons of technical 
competence and democratic accountability, decisions of this sort are 
committed to the political branches.141 Judges are limited in the 
 
at 28–51, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 941; Amicus 
Brief of Antitrust Law and Economics Professors in Support of the Settlement passim, 
Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 275 (same as Elhauge, 
supra, in brief format); Randal C. Picker, Assessing Competition Issues in the Amended 
Google Book Search Settlement 3–5 (Univ. of Chi. Inst. for Law & Econ. Olin Research 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 499, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507172 
(giving reasons to believe that antitrust scrutiny could be deferred until after 
implementation of settlement). The arguments given by the settlement’s antitrust 
defenders were notably more detailed than those given by most of the objectors. 
 138. See Library Ass’n Comments on the Proposed Settlement at 19–21, Authors 
Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 387 (expressing concern but 
recommending continued oversight rather than rejection of the settlement); Pamela 
Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 94 MINN L. REV. 
1308, 1333–44 (2010) (describing “[l]ibrary and [a]cademic [r]esearcher [n]ightmares” 
including price-gouging and exacerbated inequality among institutions). 
 139. See Privacy Authors and Publishers’ Objection to Proposed Settlement at 8, 
Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 325; Brief Amicus Curiae 
of the Center for Democracy & Technology in Support of Approval of the Settlement and 
Protection of Reader Privacy at 7–11, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 
8136), ECF No. 314; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of EPIC’s 
[Electronic Privacy Information Center] Motion to Intervene at 14–15, Authors Guild, 770 
F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), available at http://thepublicindex.org 
/docs/letters/epic.pdf. 
 140. See NAGAREDA, supra note 116, at 61 (“Adjudication characteristically deals with 
the legal consequences of past conduct for particular purposes. . . . Rulemaking, by 
contrast, characteristically involves the setting of legal standards for the future that bind 
the public at large.”). 
 141. See, e.g., MARTIN REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009) (arguing that 
broad swaths of class-action law are democratically illegitimate because they cause courts 
to reach beyond the judicial function); James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of 
Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1531, 1534 (1973) [hereinafter Henderson, Judicial Review] (“But courts are not 
suited to the task of establishing specific product safety standards . . . .”); James A. 
Henderson, Jr., Comment: Settlement Class Actions and the Limits of Adjudication, 80 
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sources of information they can draw on; they are ill-suited to balance 
conflicting normative claims in an open-textured way; they are not 
directly accountable to the people whose lives they will reshape. For 
all of these reasons, the judicial branch is normally considered an 
inferior place to resolve polycentric problems.142 In Richard 
Nagareda’s words, “[T]he basis for the implied delegation of 
bargaining power to class counsel must arise from matters that 
preexist the class action itself and, accordingly, . . . a class 
settlement—unlike public legislation—enjoys no general mandate to 
alter unilaterally the rights of class members.”143 
By having a single group draft a settlement, the class-action 
process tends toward central planning. By submitting that settlement 
to a judge for approval, it channels everything through the actor least 
competent to make the intricate technical decisions and contestable 
value tradeoffs required.144 Because the judge is not permitted to 
modify the settlement but must give an up-or-down ruling on it,145 the 
class-action settlement process delegates tremendous agenda-setting 
power to the attorneys.146 We should not expect the resulting 
arrangements to reflect anything like majoritarian preferences. They 
are not “appropriate for judicial, as opposed to legislative, 
resolution.”147 
The healthcare reform hypothetical is a good illustration of these 
dangers. Congress spent months of intense debate and horse-trading 
on the Affordable Care Act; the near-complete attention of the 
 
CORNELL L. REV. 1014 passim (1995) [hereinafter Henderson, Settlement Class Actions] 
(extending argument to mass tort class actions). 
 142. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Form and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
353, 394–404 (1978) (developing idea that a “situation of interacting points of influence” is 
“beyond the proper limits of adjudication”). 
 143. Nagareda, supra note 96, at 156–57. 
 144. See Fuller, supra note 142, at 394–404 (arguing that “polycentric” tasks—in which 
each decision has complex repercussions—are “inherently unsuited to adjudication”); 
Henderson, Judicial Review, supra note 141, at 1534 (arguing that “[c]ourts are inherently 
unsuited” to such “polycentric” tasks as establishing product safety standards for 
manufacturers). 
 145. See, e.g., Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1160 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Courts 
are not permitted to modify settlement terms or in any manner to rewrite the agreement 
reached by the parties.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 
1236 (1982). 
 147. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 894 (2012) (citing Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 
770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). 
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nation’s political institutions was focused on the issue.148 What 
emerged was a complex compromise, one that achieved majority 
support in Congress only through extensive modification to meet the 
demands of numerous constituencies.149 As printed in the Statutes at 
Large, it takes up 906 pages.150 If all of this could have been done 
instead by a court, why even have a Congress?151 The point is even 
starker with the skyscraper settlement. Eminent domain is supposed 
to be an inherently public process for which the political branches can 
be held accountable: the Public Use Clause prohibits privatizing the 
process.152 A class-action settlement, however, is drafted by a private 
party and overseen only by the judicial branch: precisely the opposite 
of the way the system is supposed to work.153 
Sometimes, judges cannot avoid being caught up in these 
“legislative” functions. The rise of structural reform litigation—
lawsuits challenging school segregation, prison overcrowding, police 
brutality, and other systemic governmental abuses—required judges 
to engage deeply with the creation and governance of institutions, 
and to make prospective decisions about how they would be run in 
ways that would affect large populations.154 In all of these cases, 
 
 148. See generally LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & THEDA SKOCPOL, HEALTH CARE 
REFORM AND AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW (2010) 
(describing history of PPACA). 
 149. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2675 (2012) (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 150. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119, 119–124 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 151. Cf. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“[T]he establishment of a mechanism for exploiting unclaimed books is a matter more 
suited for Congress than this Court. . . . The questions of who should be entrusted with 
guardianship over orphan books, under what terms, and with what safeguards are matters 
more appropriately decided by Congress than through an agreement among private, self-
interested parties.”); id. at 680 (deferring to Congress in setting copyright policy in 
response to technological change); id. at 685–86 (deferring to Congress given the 
international ramifications of the settlement); Samuelson, supra note 13, at 482 (“An 
intriguing way to view the GBS settlement is as a mechanism through which to achieve 
copyright reform that Congress has not yet been and may never be willing to do.”). 
 152. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings 
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782–83 (1995) (arguing that 
courts’ role in enforcing the Public Use clause should focus on failures of the political 
process). 
 153. Cf. Rubenstein, supra note 81, at 432 (“[D]ealmaking appears to contradict a 
fundamental premise of adjudication—namely, that the substantive outcomes of cases 
should depend upon the application of pre-existing legal norms.”). 
 154. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1281, 1284 (1976) (describing new “public law litigation” model that departs from 
traditional party-centric adversarial model and requires “complex forms of ongoing relief” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword, The Forms of Justice, 93 
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however, the problem comes at the remedial stage.155 If a prison 
system is overcrowded to a degree that violates the Constitution, then 
the judge hearing a class-action lawsuit by the inmates must do 
something about it, or the constitutional violation will continue.156 If a 
school system is unlawfully segregated and refuses to change its 
practices, then the political branches have shirked their responsibility 
to an extent that itself violates the law.157 There is no alternative to 
judicial involvement; there is no road around the swamp.158 
In contrast, a future-conduct settlement is never necessary in this 
sense.159 Litigation is always an option. The resulting judgment will 
define the defendant’s rights and duties vis-à-vis the class, and it will 
therefore provide a roadmap for their future dealings.160 The 
outcomes available in litigation may not be socially optimal, but if 
they are not, it is the legislature’s responsibility to fix the problem, 
not the courts’.161 The purpose of class certification is “to generate 
 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1979); Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of 
Adjudication, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 125 (1982) [hereinafter Fiss, The Social and 
Political Foundations of Adjudication]. 
 155. The signal remedial innovation of public-law litigation was its development of 
novel injunctions on the defendant institutions. See generally OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978) (describing increased use of structural injunctions in civil 
rights litigation and providing jurisprudential justification of the practice). This 
immediately distinguishes it from the imposition of future-conduct releases on class 
members. For a discussion of the historical link between reform litigation and modern 
class action procedure, see generally David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation 
Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011). 
 156. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the 
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 467 (1980) (arguing that 
structural reform cases are driven by recognition of new constitutional rights). 
 157. See William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies 
and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 692 (1982). 
 158. Indeed, in these situations, settlements risk becoming ways to avoid enforcing the 
law. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (arguing that 
the judicial role is “to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative 
texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality 
into accord with them”). 
 159. Cf. Henderson, Settlement Class Actions, supra note 141, at 1021 (contrasting 
public-law litigation with settlements that “delegate[] power to the powerful”). 
 160. Indeed, this is a strong argument against future-conduct settlements. They deprive 
others on the plaintiff side the benefit of an actual ruling on the issue in question while 
giving the defendant benefits denied to others in its position. Cf. Fiss, The Social and 
Political Foundations of Adjudication, supra note 154, at 121. (arguing for public value of 
open litigation); infra Part III.B.4 (discussing danger of a settlement good for one 
defendant only). 
 161. This point depends on a normative belief about the proper roles of courts and 
legislatures in a democratic system. Compare Chayes, supra note 154, at 1297−98 
(defending expansive judicial role), and Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of 
Adjudication, supra note 154, at 126−27 (same), with DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE 
COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 22−23 (1977) (arguing against expansive judicial role), and 
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common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation,” not 
social reform.162 
III.  A STANDARD: HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 
Future-conduct releases are unusually dangerous to class 
members, and sometimes even to society. Courts can and should 
respond to these dangers by scrutinizing settlements containing 
future-conduct releases more closely, and in some cases prohibiting 
them entirely. The former is a standard; the latter is a rule. Start with 
the standard. 
A. Doctrinal Justification 
The presence of a future-conduct release is, at the very least, a 
major warning sign that this is not a run-of-the-mill settlement.163 
Courts should, nay must, look on future-conduct settlements with 
more than their usual skepticism.164 They are required to do so by the 
 
ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS 
WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 197 (2004) (same). The same decisions must also be 
made in debates about the judicial role in supervising class actions. Compare Jack B. 
Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 559 (1994) 
(arguing for active judicial role), with PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: 
MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 258−59 (1988) (expressing skepticism about 
Judge Weinstein’s close involvement in brokering the Agent Orange settlement); see also 
REDISH, supra note 141, at 27 (arguing that democratic principles require more stringent 
limits on class actions). As a matter of doctrine, the decision has already been made in 
favor of a limited judicial role. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999) 
(“[W]e are bound to follow Rule 23 as we understood it upon its adoption, and . . . we are 
not free to alter it except through the process prescribed by Congress in the Rules 
Enabling Act.”); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628−29 (1997) (“The 
argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing regime 
would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of 
asbestos exposure. Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution.”). 
 162. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (emphasis omitted 
and added) (quoting Richard Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 974, 131–32 (2009)). 
 163. Cf. Issacharoff, supra note 117, at 833 (“Any class seeking to bind future claimants 
or foreclose future harms should also be suspect—particularly if these future claims do not 
create an active case or controversy under applicable substantive law.”). 
 164. There is precedent for this approach. Courts have learned to identify indicia of 
potential unfairness and to apply heightened scrutiny to settlements when those indicia are 
present. For example, compensation to class members in the form of coupons rather than 
cash is “enough to raise suspicions.” In re Mex. Money Transfer Litig., 267 F.3d 743, 748 
(7th Cir. 2001). Congress has effectively codified this judicial suspicion of coupon 
settlements. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, § 3(a), 119 Stat. 4, 6 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1712(e) (2006)) (requiring “[j]udicial [s]crutiny of [c]oupon [s]ettlements”). See 
generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action 
Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANAL. 167 (2009) (discussing “facial issues” justifying more than 
usual scrutiny of settlements). 
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text of Rule 23, and by the Due Process Clause—and perhaps even by 
constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction. 
1.  Rule 23 
Rule 23(a)(4)’s guarantee of adequate representation requires 
courts to ensure that class counsel’s advocacy reaches a basic 
threshold of zealousness.165 But the bargaining around a future-
conduct release is so open-ended that there is no meaningful 
procedural standard by which a court can evaluate whether class 
counsel have been sufficiently vigorous in the negotiations. 
Substantive “hard-look” review of the resulting settlement is the only 
viable alternative. 
That review comes from Rule 23(e)(2), which provides that a 
court may only approve a settlement binding class members on a 
finding that it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”166 The courts of 
appeals implement this requirement with multi-factor balancing 
tests.167 The courts “have wide discretion in assessing the weight and 
applicability of each factor,”168 so the special risks of future-conduct 
releases can easily be folded into these factors.169 
2.  Due Process 
Heightened scrutiny goes deeper than just Rule 23: it is also 
required by the Due Process Clause. In class action cases, Due 
Process requires adequate representation “at all times,”170 which in 
turn requires closer oversight from the court in future-conduct cases. 
 
 165. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4); see id. 23(g)(4) (requiring that counsel “must fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the class”); see also id. 23(g)(1)(B) (stating that the 
court “may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the class”). 
 166. Id. 23(e)(2). 
 167. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (listing 
eight factors to be considered); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 
1974) (listing nine factors to be considered), abrogated on other grounds, Goldberger v. 
Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 168. 5 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.164[1] (Jerold S. 
Solovy et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012). 
 169. Further, in damages class actions, “class members’ interests in individually 
controlling the prosecution” of the lawsuit and settlement is stronger when the stakes are 
higher and the outcome will affect them prospectively. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A). As the 
settlement becomes more and more sweeping, the court becomes obliged to consider the 
relative “undesirability of concentrating” resolution “of the claims in the particular 
forum.” Id. 23(b)(3)(C). 
 170. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). See generally Linda S. 
Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs’ Due Process: Implications for 
Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 871 (1995) (discussing Shutts). 
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The higher stakes for class members in future-conduct settlements 
and the greater risks of error go directly to the first two factors in the 
Matthews v. Eldridge171 test: the “private interest” at stake and the 
“risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest.”172 Set against these 
concerns, the added value of heightened scrutiny is substantial and 
the cost of closer judicial attention well worth bearing. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the Supreme Court’s long-
standing concern for class members’ Due Process rights in cases 
involving potential conflicts between class members. Such conflicts, of 
course, go to adequacy of representation; conflicted class 
representatives are not constitutionally adequate representatives.173 
Future-conduct cases do not necessarily involve internal conflicts. But 
the important word in that sentence is “necessarily.” Future-conduct 
settlements can involve particularly insidious conflicts that become 
apparent only over time. The defendant may become able to behave 
differently toward class members, putting them in different shoes in 
ways they cannot predict or protect against. 
Indeed, absentees qua absentees may be in a particularly 
vulnerable position in a future-conduct settlement. This was one of 
the problems with the Google Books settlement. One of the 
justifications for the settlement was to make orphan books available 
again. But orphan owners, precisely because of their status as orphan 
owners, were essentially guaranteed to be absent class members and 
could be expected not to be active participants in the settlement’s 
administration.174 The settlement was engineered specifically to take 
advantage of their absence, and by using future-conduct releases it 
was able to achieve something very close to an exclusive license to 
their books, a license good for Google only. Heightened scrutiny is 
the very least that absent class members deserve when their 
prospective rights are at stake. 
3.  Personal Jurisdiction 
A close reading of the Supreme Court’s leading modern class-
action Due Process case, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,175 reinforces 
 
 171. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 172. Id. at 335. 
 173. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) (“Such a selection of representatives 
for purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily or even probably 
the same as those whom they are deemed to represent, does not afford that protection to 
absent parties which due process requires.”). 
 174. See supra notes 48–51, 66 and sources cited therein. 
 175. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
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this conclusion.176 The case is remembered for its holding that Due 
Process—in the form of personal jurisdiction over class members in a 
state class action—is satisfied by notice, an opt-out right, and 
adequate representation.177 But the assumptions behind that holding 
are crucial. The Court explained at length the distinctions between 
class-action plaintiffs and “a defendant in a normal civil suit[.]”178 A 
defendant faces “the full powers of the forum State to render 
judgment against it”;179 class-action plaintiffs are not “haled anywhere 
to defend themselves upon pain of a default judgment”180 and are 
“almost never subject to counterclaims or cross-claims, or liability for 
fees or costs.”181 
The underlying assumption here is that a plaintiff risks only a 
choice in action, whereas a defendant can suffer substantial harms 
from an adverse judgment. But that is precisely the contrast drawn 
above between a suit for damages and a future-conduct settlement: 
the latter can expose class members to unbounded future harms. The 
availability of future-conduct releases in class-action settlements 
therefore depends on the provision of sufficient procedural 
protections for class members: again, heightened Rule 23(e)(2) 
scrutiny is the very least they have a right to expect.182 Courts that do 
not provide it may not even have personal jurisdiction over absent 
class members who give future-conduct releases.183 
B.  Applying Heightened Scrutiny 
To put heightened scrutiny into practice, courts examining 
future-conduct releases should direct their attention to the ways those 
releases can go wrong. Thus, the concerns described above in Part II 
are a kind of inspection checklist. They are not factors to be balanced: 
an extreme risk of moral hazard cannot be outweighed by a 
 
 176. Id. at 810. 
 177. Id. at 812–13. 
 178. Id. at 810. 
 179. Id. at 808 (emphasis omitted). 
 180. Id. at 809. 
 181. Id. at 810. 
 182. Cf. id. at 810 n.2 (reserving judgment over cases in which class members are 
potentially out of pocket for counterclaims or fees). 
 183. The argument from personal jurisdiction does not directly apply to cases in federal 
court applying federal law. See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1068.1 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing 
personal jurisdiction in federal-question cases). But even there, Shutts still provides 
instructive guidance about the expected burdens and dangers to a party of being a class 
member in a distant forum. The question of the precise interaction of Rule 4, Rule 23, and 
the Fifth Amendment is best deferred to another time. 
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correspondingly low risk of concentrated power. Instead, they give 
courts a way to think through the likely consequences of approving a 
settlement. Thus, this section groups its recommendations in terms of 
those concerns, and offers specific suggestions for ways courts can 
address some of the different kinds of future-conduct risks when they 
are present in a settlement.184 
1.  High Stakes 
Because class members give up more in a settlement containing 
both past- and future-conduct releases than they do in a settlement 
containing only past-conduct releases,185 the court should expect that 
they will be given more in return. The court should make a searching 
effort to identify just what rights the class will be giving up going 
forward, to put a value on those rights, and to ask whether the 
settlement appropriately compensates them. At the very least, there 
should be some additional compensation for these releases over and 
above what a past-conduct release alone would have warranted.186 
Whenever feasible, class members should be given the choice of 
whether to accept the future-conduct portion of the settlement, or just 
the past-conduct portion.187 
 
 184. These recommendations for heightened scrutiny are not meant to create a hard-
and-fast line against future-conduct releases. For one thing, as explained infra Part IV.A, 
some settlements involving future-conduct releases are legitimate and can be fair to class 
members. For another, this Article already proposes a hard-and-fast line against some 
future-conduct releases: those that fail the parity-of-preclusion test. Instead, heightened 
scrutiny is an across-the-board standard intended to direct judicial attention to those 
aspects of future-conduct releases that are likely to be the most dangerous. 
 185. See supra Part II.A. 
 186. For example, the settlement in In re Literary Works in Electric Databases 
Copyright Litigation provided for 100% of scheduled payments to class members who 
gave a future-conduct release, and 65% of the scheduled payments for those class 
members who gave only past conduct releases. Settlement Agreement § 5.a., In re Literary 
Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d and 
remanded in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010) (Nos. 05−5943 & 
06−0223) (reducing payments by thirty five percent for those authors who opt out of 
allowing future uses). The Authors Guild settlement also displayed this feature. Compare 
Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 5.1 (one-time payment for past digitization), 
with id. art IV (ongoing payments for future uses). 
 187. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 23, § 5.1(a) (allowing class members to opt 
out of future uses without opting out of the settlement entirely); Authors Guild Amended 
Settlement, supra note 2, § 3.5(b) (allowing class members to opt out of certain future uses 
without opting out of the settlement entirely). The presence of such an option helps the 
court in assessing whether the settlement provides sufficient incremental compensation for 
future-conduct releases, because it requires them to be explicitly valued. 
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2.  Uncertainty 
Because future-conduct releases are harder to design,188 the court 
must be more skeptical of their terms. Because class members will 
have less ability to predict the consequences of such releases, the 
court should require more rigorous notice.189 Because the court itself 
will have a hard time evaluating the consequences, it should consider 
appointing a special master or an independent class representative to 
serve as a devil’s advocate in exploring the possible negative 
consequences.190 Because class counsel have weak incentives to get 
the design right in the long run if their compensation is payable 
immediately, the court should consider insisting that any awards of 
attorneys’ fees be subject to a deferred compensation scheme that 
links class counsel’s fees to the class’s fate going forward.191 
3.  Moral Hazard 
Terms that could create perverse incentives on the defendant’s 
part require especially close attention.192 The court should be careful 
 
 188. See supra Part II.B. 
 189. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (questioning 
“whether class action notice sufficient under the Constitution and Rule 23 could ever be 
given to legions so unselfconscious and amorphous” as those in an asbestos future-claims 
case); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811−12 (1985) (discussing notice 
requirement in class actions). 
 190. Variants of this idea have been regularly mooted. See, e.g., Alon Klement, Who 
Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 
REV. LITIG. 25, 28 (2002); Lahav, supra note 107, at 128−30; Rubenstein, supra note 107, 
at 1453–56; Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 461, 529 (2000). 
This proposal differs in that it focuses on a particular kind of settlement feature that poses 
special concerns. Still, it may suffer from some of the same concerns identified by other 
scholars, such as a reluctance by court-appointed guardians to guard. See Koniak & 
Cohen, supra note 79, at 1110–11. One analogy could be the “future claims representative” 
in asbestos bankruptcy cases, who is charged with “protecting the rights of persons that 
might subsequently assert demands of such kind,” i.e., future asbestos tort claims. 11 
U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i) (2006). The record there, however, is not entirely encouraging. 
See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 833, 
876–89 (2005) (discussing conflicts of interest of futures representatives); Mark D. Plevin 
et al., The Future Claims Representative in Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies, 62 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 271, 271−72 (2006) (describing capture of future claims 
representatives by debtors and current claimants); NAGAREDA, supra note 116, at 174−82 
(discussing possibilities for reform). 
 191. Cf. Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in 
Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1086–98 (2002) 
(proposing that class counsel in coupon settlements be paid in coupons); Yair Listokin & 
Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort Bankruptcies, 98 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1435, 1441 (2004) (building on earlier proposals by Mark Roe and Thomas Smith to 
link compensation of future claims representative and compensation to future claimants in 
§ 524(g) proceedings). 
 192. See supra Part II.C. 
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to detail what the worst-case scenarios for class members are, and to 
make sure that the settlement has internal safeguards against those 
scenarios. Because some problems will present themselves only over 
time, the court should retain jurisdiction so that class members can 
request modification of the settlement if it later appears that the 
settlement is going off course.193 It should also consider requiring that 
class members have the ability to opt out of the forward-looking 
provisions of the settlement in the future, once they can see what 
those provisions actually entail.194 
4.  Concentrated Power 
Because future-conduct releases can give the defendant 
concentrated power,195 the court should ask whether the settlement 
would have such an effect. The question is whether the releases 
collectively give the defendant a freedom of action that is 
qualitatively different from what it would obtain if it had an 
individual release from a single class member. This concern will be 
most prominent if the lawsuit has a commercial character (such that it 
presents antitrust risks) or if it involves class members’ speech 
interests (such that it presents risks to democratic values). The court 
should not limit its inquiry to class members’ interests; third parties 
 
 193. See Arata v. Nu Skin Int’l, Inc., 96 F.3d 1265, 1268–69 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining 
that a court approving a class-action settlement has the discretion to decide whether to 
retain jurisdiction). This is precisely what courts in future-claims cases have done. The 
court that approved the fen-phen settlement “hereby retains continuing and exclusive 
jurisdiction over this action and each of the Parties . . . to administer, supervise, interpret 
and enforce the Settlement.” Pretrial Order No. 1415 ¶ 11, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 99-20593, 2010 WL 1270348 (E.D. Pa. 2010); see also Nationwide Class Action 
Settlement Agreement with American Home Products Corp. § VIII.B.1, In re Diet Drugs 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593, 2010 WL 1270348 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (providing that the 
court “will have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all provisions of this Agreement, 
including the creation and operation of the Settlement Trust”). The settlement has since 
been amended ten times. See Tenth Amendment to the Nationwide Class Action 
Settlement Agreement with American Home Products Corp., In re Diet Drugs Prods. 
Liab. Litig. (No. 99-20593), 2010 WL 1270348 (E.D. Pa. 2010); see also Wasserman, supra 
note 63, at 458 (recommending retained jurisdiction). 
 194. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing back-end opt-out rights). If a 
future-conduct settlement does not provide for back-end opt-out rights, later courts should 
be prepared to create them by holding that absent class members were not adequately 
represented in the initial “litigation.” See generally Debra Lyn Bassett, Just Go Away: 
Representation, Due Process, and Preclusion in Class Actions, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1079, 
1126 (2009) (suggesting “the use of an opt-in procedure for unnamed class members as a 
prerequisite to applying the preclusion doctrines”). 
 195. See supra Part II.D. 
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can also be affected.196 In an appropriate case, the court may need to 
appoint a special master to help identify third parties whose 
legitimate interests are likely to be prejudiced.197 
5.  Separation of Powers 
Because future-conduct releases require the court to take on a 
legislative role,198 it should exercise great caution. Where the subject 
of the lawsuit is governed by a statute or by public-policy values 
expressed by the legislature, the court should require that the 
settlement be consistent with them.199 If the legislature has not 
spoken, the court should require that it be able to: the settlement 
must not lock in an arrangement that is not subject to legislative 
override if the court has erred.200 If representatives of the political 
branches file objections or appear at the fairness hearing, the court 
should give their views due deference.201 The court should be 
 
 196. See In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan & Irap Litig., 957 F.2d 1020, 1026 
(2d Cir. 1992) (“Where the rights of third parties are affected [by a class action 
settlement], however, their interests too must be considered.”). To be clear, I am not 
suggesting that a future-conduct settlement requires this kind of scrutiny because it could 
foreclose the rights of third parties by binding them to its terms. That would be obviously 
problematic, and inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. See Douglas Laycock, 
Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U. 
CHI. LEGAL. F. 103, 103−04 (1987) (arguing that a consent decree between two parties that 
transfers the potential rights of a third party requires consent by the third party); supra 
note 173 and accompanying text. 
 197. Cf. supra note 188–90 and accompanying text (discussing appointment of 
representative for class members with claims based on future conduct). This problem may 
sometimes be easier. The representative may need only to identify the appropriate third 
parties so that they can be given appropriate notice, after which they may be able to 
appear on their own behalf. Where these third parties are sufficiently interested in the 
settlement to have standing—which in concentrated-power cases they frequently will—
courts should be liberal in allowing them to intervene for the limited purpose of filing 
objections, so that they can both be heard and preserve their right to appeal if the 
settlement is approved. Compare Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002) (allowing 
unnamed class members to appeal from order approving settlement without formal 
intervention), with Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (preventing nonparties who 
have not intervened from appealing order approving settlement). 
 198. See supra Part II.E. 
 199. See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677, 680, 685–86 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (considering copyright policy); see also Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004) 
(holding that a consent decree “must further the objectives of the law upon which the 
complaint was based”). 
 200. The skyscraper settlement, for example, is effectively irreversible once 
construction starts. See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER 218 (1974) 
(describing judges and elected officials as “hogtied by the physical beginning of a 
project”). 
 201. Their views are not entitled to special deference on what the substantive law is; 
that is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department.” Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Instead, they are entitled to deference in their 
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concerned if it appears that the settlement will create political or 
diplomatic trouble for the political branches in their relationships 
with other jurisdictions.202 The more far-reaching the settlement, the 
more reluctant the court should be to act at all. 
IV.  A RULE: PARITY OF PRECLUSION 
The heightened-scrutiny standard applies to all settlements 
containing future-conduct releases. In a narrower class of cases, it 
should be supplemented with a bright-line rule that bars such releases 
entirely. A recurring theme in the normative case against future-
conduct releases is that they sever the connection between a 
settlement and the underlying lawsuit it “settles.”203 If so, then a 
natural response is to insist on a tighter connection between the two. 
Since releases are the principal source of danger to class members, it 
is there that the connection must be reestablished. This is the parity-
of-preclusion principle: a class-action settlement should be able to 
release a future-conduct claim if and only if the claim could have been 
lost in litigation. 
The intuitive case for parity is simple. We have already chosen 
where to draw the outer boundary around permissible class actions: 
those choices should also be reflected in the boundaries around 
permissible class-action settlements. If we trust class counsel enough 
with a claim to risk it in litigation, we should trust them also to settle 
that claim. If we do not trust them to gamble with a claim in litigation, 
we should not let them sell it, either. The job of class representatives 
is to “litigate the claims presented or settle the claims presented.”204 
 
explanations of the political considerations underlying future lawmaking. In the Google 
Books case, for example, the Register of Copyrights testified to Congress that the 
settlement could “inappropriately interfere with the on-going efforts of Congress to enact 
orphan works legislation in a manner that takes into account the concerns of all 
stakeholders” and subject the United States to “diplomatic stress.” Competition and 
Commerce in Digital Books: Hearing on the Proposed Google Book Settlement Before the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 68 (2009) (statement of Marybeth Peters, 
Register of Copyrights). 
 202. The governments of France and Germany filed amicus briefs objecting to the 
Google Books settlement, and the German government sent the head of the Division of 
Copyright and Publishing Law at the Federal Ministry of Justice to speak at the fairness 
hearing. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Settlement Proposal on Behalf of 
the French Republic, Authors Guild v. Google, No. 05 Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2009); 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Amended Settlement Agreement on Behalf of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Authors Guild v. Google, No. 05 Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 28, 2010); Transcript of Fairness Hearing, supra note 87, at 69–74. 
 203. See supra Part II. 
 204. Transcript of Fairness Hearing, supra note 87, at 119 (statement of William 
Cavanaugh). 
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One might ask whether we should ever allow future-conduct 
releases by a class. The answer is yes: sometimes we should, because 
we effectively allow them as a result of litigation. Imagine a simple 
class action for nuisance against a polluting factory by a few hundred 
nearby landowners.205 It is entirely plausible that the landowners will 
be awarded permanent damages but no injunction.206 That result is 
functionally identical to a settlement that includes future-conduct 
releases in exchange for cash compensation.207 It would be bizarre to 
argue that parties should be prohibited from settling on terms that the 
court itself might quite reasonably have ordered.208 True, the court 
will need to make sure the compensation is sufficient, and that the 
releases are appropriately limited so as not to create a perverse 
incentive for the defendant to intensify its activities—but it would 
have had to do that anyway as part of its judgment order.209 If the 
landowners can give a release only for the factory’s past conduct, then 
the case cannot practically be settled. Whatever the parties agree to 
will be effective only up through the day the settlement takes effect; 
after that, the landowners will have a fresh cause of action for the 
factory’s future pollution. The only stable settlement would be a 
complete capitulation by the factory, one in which it agrees to shut 
down. By contrast, if the landowners can give a future-conduct 
release, then the range of possible settlements reflects the full range 
of plausible outcomes in litigation. 
This example illustrates three things. First, the legal system 
sometimes already allows plaintiffs to put future-conduct claims in 
 
 205. E.g., Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 406 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 206. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970) (granting 
permanent damages in lieu of injunction). 
 207. This is just a rephrasing of the distinction between property rules and liability 
rules. Both the permanent damages in lieu of injunction and the settlement for a future-
conduct release amount to the transfer of the relevant entitlement to the defendant at an 
“objectively determined value.” Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 
1092 (1972). 
 208. See, e.g., In re: Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 535 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“[T]here is an overriding public interest in settling class action litigation, and it should 
therefore be encouraged.”); Bonnette v. Long Island Coll. Hosp., 819 N.E.2d 206, 209 
(2004) (describing the State’s “strong policy promoting settlement”). But see Fiss, supra 
note 158, at 1085–87 (arguing that settlement erodes public-law values served by 
adjudication). 
 209. Again, this point simply reflects the property-rule/liability-rule distinction. The 
court awarding liability-rule protection must both define the entitlement and put a value 
on it, and those tasks are necessary both in settlement and in an ordinary judgment. See 
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 207, at 1092 (“[L]iability rules involve an additional 
stage of state intervention . . . .”). 
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play. Second, for reasons of judicial economy, the system already 
prefers to resolve those claims together with the rest of the dispute.210 
And third, the policies promoting settlement counsel in favor of 
letting parties do by settlement what the court could have imposed on 
them. Taken together, these points establish the principle: since some 
class actions really do test the legality of a defendant’s future conduct, 
settlements of those class actions can do so, too.211 
This Part will flesh out this account of parity of preclusion. Part 
IV.A will explain what it means to say that a claim “could have been 
lost in litigation,” giving that phrase a precise meaning in terms of 
preclusion doctrine. Part IV.B will analyze the courts’ closest 
approximation to parity of preclusion: the identical factual predicate 
doctrine. Part IV.C will defend parity on doctrinal grounds. Part IV.D 
will answer doctrinal objections. Finally, Part IV.E will defend parity 
on normative grounds. 
A. Claims that Can and Cannot Be Precluded 
To understand how far the parity-of-preclusion principle reaches, 
it is necessary to be precise about when one could “lose a claim in 
litigation.” And that, in turn, requires us to be precise about the body 
of law that deals with losing claims in litigation: preclusion doctrine.212 
Imagine a plaintiff class that sues a defendant and loses. What is 
the largest possible set of claims that could be precluded against class 
members as a result? For the sake of the hypothetical, we can assume 
that the class will bring the broadest possible suit. Because the federal 
Rules permit plaintiffs to join all of their claims against the defendant 
in one action,213 a single class action can litigate every claim arising 
out of the defendant’s conduct that is susceptible to class treatment.214 
 
 210. This point recalls the maxim that equity will take jurisdiction to avoid a 
multiplicity of suits. 
 211. This is most apparent for mandatory class actions by necessity under Rule 
23(b)(1)(A), when individual lawsuits would risk “incompatible standards of conduct” for 
the defendant. FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). The entire point of such a class action is to 
decide the legality of the defendant’s future conduct all at once. Unless some future-
conduct releases are available, such class actions can never be settled. The same goes for 
injunctive-relief class actions under Rule 23(b)(2). “[F]inal injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole” only when 
there is some future conduct to which that relief could apply. Id. 23(b)(2). 
 212. See generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2005) (discussing application of preclusion doctrines to class 
members). 
 213. FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a). 
 214. See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 881 (1984) (finding 
no preclusive effect on individual claims of discrimination from a judgment in a class 
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Ripeness, however, will limit the suit to claims arising out of the 
defendant’s past conduct.215 Pleading doctrines prevent the 
complaint—and hence the lawsuit—from going beyond what the 
defendant has actually done.216 Nor can the class go further by 
seeking a declaratory judgment or a preventative injunction. 
Although they deal with the defendant’s threatened future conduct, 
that conduct must genuinely be threatened on the basis of the 
defendant’s actual past conduct.217 
Claim preclusion will bar all of the claims litigated to a “valid and 
final” judgment.218 Again for the sake of the hypothetical we can 
assume that all of the claims asserted in the complaint are fully 
 
action alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) (1980) (denying claim-preclusive effect when the plaintiff “was 
unable to rely on a certain theory of the case . . . because of the limitations on the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the courts”); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 863–64 
(1999) (“[T]he settlement’s fairness under Rule 23(e) does not dispense with the 
requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b).”); Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 
(1997) (“[Provisions of Rule 23] designed to protect absentees . . . demand undiluted, even 
heightened, attention in the settlement context.”). 
 215. This line between past and future is no more uncertain than the one courts already 
must draw between present and future claims. See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra 
note 9, at 1625 (discussing line between present and future claims). 
 216. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (stating that an attorney submitting a pleading 
certifies that its “factual contentions have evidentiary support”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (“Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. 
A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the 
Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous 
parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(holding that a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter” that its “ ‘claim to relief 
. . . is plausible on its face’ ” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007))). 
 217. On declaratory judgments, see 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006) (restricting a federal 
court’s ability to award declaratory relief to “a case of actual controversy within its 
jurisdiction”); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 216, 239–40 (1937) (“The 
Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to ‘cases of actual controversy,’ 
manifestly has regard to the constitutional provision and is operative only in respect to 
controversies which are such in the constitutional sense.”). On preventative injunctions, 
see Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (holding that plaintiff lacked Article III 
standing to seek an injunction against police use of chokeholds, since there was no “real 
and immediate threat” that he would be choked in the future). While Lyons has been 
criticized by commentators who regret that it makes some unlawful governmental 
practices effectively unchallengeable, see, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Of Justiciability, 
Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (1984), future-conduct releases show that broad justiciability standards are a 
two-edged sword. While broad justiciability might allow for the vindication of individual 
rights in cases like Lyons, broad justiciability could be used to eliminate individual rights 
entirely in future-conduct settlements. 
 218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17, 19 (1980); see also Parklane 
Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979) (comparing and explaining the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel). 
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litigated. Since the class can only plead ripe claims, claim preclusion 
can only bar ripe claims—i.e., those arising out of the defendant’s past 
conduct.219 
Issue preclusion, however, can effectively extinguish some 
future-conduct claims. The basic rule of issue preclusion is that 
parties to a lawsuit may not relitigate any issues decided against them 
that were “essential” to the judgment.220 Only past-conduct claims 
and the issues they present can be litigated—but where a future-
conduct claim depends on an issue actually litigated, issue preclusion 
can apply to it. Thus, issue preclusion can bar those future-conduct 
claims that share an essential issue with a past-conduct claim that the 
class could have brought. 
The implications for parity of preclusion are straightforward. 
Any past-conduct claim can be barred by claim preclusion, and hence 
can be settled. Any future-conduct claim that depends on an issue 
essential to a past-conduct claim can be barred by issue preclusion, 
and hence can also be settled. Neither form of preclusion could apply 
to future-conduct claims that are materially different from any past-
conduct claims the class can bring—call them “novel” future-conduct 
claims—and hence these claims cannot be settled. Ripeness draws the 
line between “past” and “future” conduct; pleading doctrines enforce 
that line by preventing the parties from presenting fictional issues. 
The effect is to require a close connection between the past conduct 
challenged in the lawsuit and the future conduct permitted by the 
settlement: generally only a materially identical continuation of the 
defendant’s past conduct will satisfy parity of preclusion. 
A court applying this test must exercise care in two respects. The 
first is that a complaint submitted by class counsel seeking settlement 
cannot always be taken at face value. The reviewing court must be 
willing to look beyond the complaint at least to the extent required by 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal221 and Rule 11. The plaintiffs in the pollution suit 
would not, for example, have been allowed to submit a complaint 
 
 219. It does not matter that claim preclusion also bars any causes of action arising out 
of the same “transaction, or series of connected transactions,” that a plaintiff could have 
asserted but did not. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1980); see also 
United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1730 (2011) (referencing 
Restatement rule as the “now-accepted test in preclusion”). We have already assumed 
that the class asserts every cause of action it can. 
 220. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17, 27 (1980). 
 221. 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 
on its face.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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alleging that the factory’s employees were about to punch them in the 
face, then settle the suit by allowing the employees to punch them in 
the face. That complaint would have been improper, since its factual 
allegations would have lacked “evidentiary support” and there would 
have been no nonfrivolous argument for the legal claims arising out 
of those allegations. The same goes, of course, for a complaint whose 
relevant facts are the product of collusion, or for one that contains 
factual and legal allegations that are obviously pretextual. 
Unsupported matter included in the complaint solely to expand the 
range of possible settlements must be stricken.222 
The second point requiring care is the task of determining the 
scope of issue preclusion due to a hypothetical judgment. It is possible 
for a judgment to have almost no issue-preclusive effect: e.g., a 
holding that the defendant did not punch the plaintiff in the face on 
January 3 will not dispose of any claims (over and above the ones 
already taken care of by claim preclusion). But it is also possible for a 
judgment to have substantial issue-preclusive effect. If a court holds 
that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, holds good title to a parcel of 
land, a wide range of actual and possible trespass claims will vanish all 
at once. The outer limit of issue preclusion’s effect is therefore 
determined by the fact-sensitive question of what issues could have 
been resolved against the class in the underlying lawsuit. Where an 
essential issue really could have been resolved against the class and 
really would operate as a bar a future-conduct claim, the class can 
properly release that claim in settlement.223 
B.  The Identical Factual Predicate Doctrine 
The closest that the courts have come to this reasoning is to hold 
that a class-action settlement may release claims if they arise out of an 
“identical factual predicate” as the claims asserted in the underlying 
lawsuit.224 This doctrine is close enough to the parity of preclusion 
 
 222. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (allowing court to “strike from a pleading . . . any 
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” sua sponte). 
 223. It is possible to object to this rule on the ground that it encourages the defendant 
to take aggressive action toward the class in order to increase the number of ripe issues 
that can be settled. There are three replies. First, that same aggressive action will increase 
the chances that the defendant will be sued by class representatives who will refuse to 
settle, providing negative feedback on any increased tendency for the defendant to be 
aggressive. Second, without a ripeness test, the defendant will never be exposed to any 
legal risk at all, so imposing one increases the class’s leverage. And third, the parity of 
preclusion rule cannot prevent all abuses of future-conduct releases by itself: that is why 
courts must still apply a heightened scrutiny standard as well. 
 224. See, e.g., Hesse v. Spring Corp., 598 F.3d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 2010); Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 107 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of 
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principle that it can and should be interpreted simply to embody the 
principle. Indeed, a failure to recognize the general principle is the 
source of the confusion infecting the identical-factual-predicate 
doctrine. The courts have not clearly distinguished between the 
effects of claim and issue preclusion. Instead, as this section explains, 
they have pushed the logic of claim preclusion beyond what it can 
reasonably bear in order to accommodate settlements that seem 
unobjectionable. 
The identical-factual-predicate doctrine emerged in National 
Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange.225 There, a price-
fixing lawsuit over potato futures reached a settlement that covered 
both the “liquidated” claims of traders who had sold their contracts at 
a loss and the “unliquidated” claims of traders who had held onto 
their contracts but never received the promised potatoes.226 Since the 
class representatives held only liquidated claims, the settlement could 
easily have been rejected on conflict-of-interest grounds, but Judge 
Friendly added: 
If a judgment after trial cannot extinguish claims not asserted in 
the class action complaint, a judgment approving a settlement 
in such an action ordinarily should not be able to do so 
either. . . . We assume that a settlement could properly be 
framed so as to prevent class members from subsequently 
asserting claims relying on a legal theory different from that 
relied upon in the class action complaint but depending upon 
the very same set of facts. This is not such a case.227 
This passage is a clear articulation of the close relationship between 
adequate representation and preclusion.228 Unfortunately, perhaps 
because National Super Spuds was not a future-conduct case, Judge 
Friendly drew only on the language of claim preclusion. “[D]epending 
 
Am. Sales Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 367 (3d Cir. 2001). A particularly telling variation 
comes from Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1992), which asked 
whether the released and settled claims “arise from the same common nucleus of 
operative fact.” Id. at 1288; see also In re Phila. Stock Exch., Inc., 945 A.2d 1123, 1146 n.48 
(Del. 2008) (“Although the phraseology of these concepts (‘identical factual predicate’ 
and ‘same set of operative facts’) may be different, their substantive meaning is the 
same.”). This is the language of supplemental jurisdiction, see United Mine Workers v. 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), which reinforces the argument that parity of preclusion is 
a jurisdictional limit on the federal courts, see infra Part IV.C. 
 225. 660 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 226. See id. at 13–14. 
 227. Id. at 18 & n.7. 
 228. Cf. supra note 96 (discussing the binding nature of representational litigation). 
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on the very same set of facts” focuses on the underlying facts of the 
claims, much as claim preclusion does.229 
The phrase “identical factual predicate” in this context comes 
from TBK Partners, Ltd. v. Western Union Corp.230 In approving a 
broad settlement of past-conduct claims, the court wrote: 
We therefore conclude that in order to achieve a 
comprehensive settlement that would prevent relitigation of 
settled questions at the core of a class action, a court may 
permit the release of a claim based on the identical factual 
predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled class action 
even though the claim was not presented and might not have 
been presentable in the class action.231 
Here, although the court identifies a goal that sounds in issue 
preclusion (“relitigation of settled questions”) the actual test uses 
language that comes from claim preclusion (“identical factual 
predicate”). This slippage is harmless for past-conduct cases, where 
broad joinder rules mean that anything that was fair game for issue 
preclusion will be fair game for claim preclusion as well. But it leads 
to confusion in future-conduct cases. The problem is that focusing on 
factual similarities, rather than legal similarities, provides little useful 
guidance as to how far a chain of transactions can be stretched before 
one of the links breaks. 
The courts applying the identical factual predicate doctrine to 
future-conduct cases have split on precisely this question. The 
Delaware Chancery Court held that future conduct and past conduct 
could never share an identical factual predicate: “If the facts have not 
yet occurred, then they cannot possibly be the basis for the underlying 
action.”232 But the Second Circuit held that it is “not improper” to 
release claims for future infringements as long as the complaint 
“contemplates these alleged future injuries.”233 The Restatement 
explains that the concept of “transaction” is “to be determined 
pragmatically,”234 but the courts do not have a good sense of which 
 
 229. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1980) (barring claims 
“with respect to . . . the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the 
action arose”). 
 230. 675 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 231. Id. at 460. 
 232. Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 898 A.2d 344, 347 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
 233. In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242, 248 (2d 
Cir. 2011). 
 234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2) (1980). 
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factors are relevant when contemplating a future-conduct release.235 
Parity of preclusion supplies the answer. 
C.   Doctrinal Justification 
Thus far, the case for parity of preclusion has been intuitive 
rather than doctrinally rigorous. While the identical factual predicate 
doctrine offers an obvious basis for parity of preclusion, the doctrine 
itself has never been rigorously grounded. It is general common law, 
followed by both federal and state courts, but with no explicit basis in 
constitution, statute, or rule. For some readers, this will be sufficient 
to justify the principle as a prudential judge-made doctrine. This 
section will provide a more rigorous foundation for those readers who 
want one. 
The basic structure of the argument is simple: unlitigable class 
claims are by definition outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts 
over class actions.236 The contrast to individual releases, which are 
effective as a matter of contract law, is instructive. Even when the 
court enters a contract as a judgment to facilitate enforcement, it is 
enforcing a private contract. Class-action settlements are not and 
cannot be contracts, because class representatives are authorized to 
litigate on behalf of their fellows, not to negotiate contracts. The only 
way to make a release binding on a class is for the court to use its 
judgment power—and that it cannot do unless it has jurisdiction over 
the released claims in the first place. Article III’s constitutional limit 
on federal jurisdiction, statutory limits on federal jurisdiction, and 
Rule 23’s limits on which class actions can be certified by a federal 
court all point in the same direction. Unlitigable claims are 
unsettleable because they are categorically unripe. 
For space reasons, this Article discusses only federal doctrines 
that would limit future-conduct releases. But all the same normative 
arguments apply to state courts, and doctrinally, state jurisdiction is 
not a free-for-all. States may have broader conceptions of what they 
consider to be a justiciable case, states may have courts of general 
 
 235. See generally Mary Kay Kane, Original Sin and the Transaction in Federal Civil 
Procedure, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1723 (1998) (discussing multiple meanings of “transaction” 
standard and emphasizing its flexibility). 
 236. This is not the only parity-based bright-line jurisdictional limit on future-conduct 
releases one could attempt to defend. Another approach would focus on future parties 
rather than on future-conduct claims. See Schuwerk, supra note 9, at 227. On this theory, 
future-conduct releases could not bind individuals who were not part of the class at the 
time of the settlement. The problem with such an approach is that it draws arbitrary 
distinctions based on whether parties are part of a class for unrelated reasons. A claim-
based approach more properly focuses on the actual content of the releases. 
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subject-matter jurisdiction, and states may have fewer prerequisites to 
class certification. But the states do still have limits: some matters are 
too abstract and unripe to present cases their courts will entertain, 
and some classes are too diffuse for them to certify. The point of 
parity of preclusion is that wherever a jurisdiction sets those limits, 
they should apply equally in litigation and in settlement. 
1.  Article III Jurisdiction 
Novel future-conduct claims are unripe.237 They do not present a 
litigable case or controversy; the federal courts have no jurisdiction 
over them.238 Courts do not magically acquire such jurisdiction 
 
 237. One could also try to analyze the issue in terms of the related doctrine of Article 
III standing. Cf., e.g., Gaston, supra note 9, at 223–24 (discussing limitations on standing 
for class action claimants with regard to future injuries). Indeed, standing and ripeness 
“are closely related, most notably in the shared requirement that the injury be imminent 
rather than conjectural or hypothetical.” Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. B v. Legal Servs. 
Corp., 462 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 2006). But ripeness, which controls when a claim can be 
brought, is a better fit for future-conduct releases than standing, which controls who can 
bring the claim. 
  Martin Redish and Andrianna D. Kastanek have argued that settlement class 
actions in general violate Article III because they are non-adversarial. Martin H. Redish & 
Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, 
and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 550–51 (2006). This 
position has not carried the day in the courts, but it applies with even greater force to 
novel future-conduct settlements, where the claims being settled not only are not being 
litigated but could not be litigated. Here, however, the lack of an adversarial case is a 
function of the lack of ripeness, rather than vice-versa. 
 238. Cf. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 71 n.3 (1976) (explaining that the district court 
lacks jurisdiction over class members who “will be denied enrollment’ ” in Medicare) 
(quoting Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 1, 7 (S.D. Fla. 1973)). Matthews involved 
administrative exhaustion, but other cases have issued similar holdings as a matter of 
Article III. See, e.g., Catron v. City of St. Petersburg, No. 8:09-cv-923-T-23EAJ, 2010 WL 
917609, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2010) (“Furthermore, the plaintiffs cannot assert a claim 
on behalf of a nonexistent member of the class who, at some hypothetical time in the 
future, ‘will be’ homeless and ‘would be’ subject to any of the City's alleged ‘policies, 
practices[,] or customs.’ ” (internal citation omitted)); Minority Police Officers Ass’n of S. 
Bend v. S. Bend, 555 F. Supp. 921, 924–25 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (holding no jurisdiction to 
include future minority police officers in employment discrimination case), aff’d in part, 
appeal dismissed in part, 721 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1983). While other courts do sometimes 
certify classes including future class members, see, e.g., Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. 
McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1335 (2d Cir. 1992) (describing previous class of “all Haitian aliens 
who are currently detained or who will in the future be detained” (emphasis added)), such 
classes are frequently open to subsequent challenge by class members, see, e.g., id. at 1337–
38 (rejecting preclusive effect of prior class action against class members on multiple 
grounds). Such certifications are unnecessary to vindicate the rights of future claimants; a 
better model is to treat them as beneficiaries of a favorable outcome for the class, while 
allowing the defendant to rely only on the weaker effect of stare decisis rather than res 
judicata to bind them to an unfavorable result. See, e.g., South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610, 614 
(7th Cir. 1985) (allowing intervention by formerly future class member); Kaczynski, supra 
note 9, at 411–12. 
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because the claims arrive at the clerk’s office on a piece of paper 
labeled “Proposed Settlement Agreement” rather than one labeled 
“Complaint.” 
This argument does not depend on any particular theory of how 
far Article III extends. You and I may disagree on which claims 
actually are ripe, and why. But once we agree that a claim could not 
be litigated, and that it is so different in kind from any claims that 
could be litigated that it cannot be precluded by them, we have 
already decided that it is outside Article III’s ambit.239 Whatever 
ripeness’s limit is, it applies equally in litigation, in preclusion, and in 
settlement. In a settlement, the parties will all be urging approval, but 
the court “cannot rely upon concessions of the parties and must 
determine whether the issues are ripe for decision in the ‘Case or 
Controversy’ sense.”240 
Nor is Article III satisfied with respect to future-conduct claims 
just because some other claims do present a live case or controversy. 
If you breach a contract with me, I can sue you for the breach. But I 
cannot also sue to enjoin you from burning down my house. My 
hypothetical claims against you for the house-burning are not part of 
the same Article III case or controversy as my contract claims.241 So 
too with future-conduct settlements. The court does not acquire 
jurisdiction over unlitigable future-conduct claims merely because it 
has jurisdiction over some other, genuine claims by the class. 
Indeed, the policies behind the case or controversy requirement 
are the same ones counseling caution about future-conduct releases. 
Deferring decisions until better factual information is available about 
their consequences?242 Check.243 Letting individuals make their own 
 
 239. See, e.g. Schuwerk, supra note 9, at 81 (“To the extent those claims have not 
matured by the time of the court’s ruling, they never ripen into the concrete adverseness 
necessary for a justiciable case or controversy and the court never acquires jurisdiction to 
pass upon them.”) 
 240. Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138 (1974). 
 241. Standing doctrine is instructive here. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 
332, 352 (2006) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to 
press.”). This policy appeals to—indeed, derives from—considerations of ripeness. See id. 
(holding that a broader definition of standing would mean that “a federal court would be 
free to entertain moot or unripe claims”); cf. Pagán v. Calderón, 448 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 
2006) (“The standing inquiry is both plaintiff-specific and claim-specific.”). 
 242. See WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532.2 (3d ed. 
2011) (“[T]he central concern of [ripeness] is that the tendered claim involves uncertain 
and contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at 
all.”). 
 243. See supra Part II.A–B. 
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decisions?244 Check.245 Separation of powers?246 Check.247 “[R]ipeness 
is peculiarly a question of timing.”248 It requires courts to wait to 
decide a claim until it is properly presented, and that is exactly what 
parity of preclusion accomplishes. It does not keep these matters out 
of the courts forever, but only until such time as there is a genuine 
legal dispute about them.249 
2.  Statutory Jurisdiction 
Parity of preclusion is also a limit on the statutory jurisdiction of 
the federal courts. Congress has not even attempted to confer 
jurisdiction over novel future-conduct claims. Where a district court 
lacks original jurisdiction over a future-conduct claim standing on its 
own, there is no provision of federal law that confers such jurisdiction 
merely because it is included in a class-action settlement. 
Supplemental jurisdiction extends only to claims that “form part of 
the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution” as a claim over which the court has original 
jurisdiction.250 Similarly the Declaratory Judgment Act limits itself to 
“a case of actual controversy” that is already “within [the court’s] 
jurisdiction,”251 thereby incorporating the Article III limit. 
Nor do the Federal Rules attempt to confer such jurisdiction. 
Rule 82 is crystal-clear: the Federal Rules “do not extend or limit the 
jurisdiction of the district courts[.]”252 There is no exception for class 
 
 244. See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or 
Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 310–15 (1979). 
 245. See supra Part II.D. 
 246. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (stating that a “basic 
rationale” of ripeness is “to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an 
administrative decision has been formalized”). 
 247. See supra Part II.E. 
 248. Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974). 
 249. One might object that a person considering an action that might be held to 
infringe a group’s rights would be unwilling to take the steps that would create a ripe 
question, and therefore the issue would never come before the courts. So, for example, if 
Alice is considering putting up a factory but is afraid her neighbors will sue for nuisance, 
she might never make the investment without an advance settlement to insulate her from 
liability, and so the issue will never come before a court at all. But we have already made 
that decision. We made it when we refused to let the neighbors sue Alice in advance, 
because the issue was unripe. And we made it again when we refused to let Alice bring a 
declaratory judgment action against the class, again because the issue was unripe. All that 
parity of preclusion requires is that we repeat this decision for settlements as well as 
lawsuits. Claims that are unripe in the one are unripe in the other. 
 250. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006). 
 251. Id. § 2201(a) . 
 252. FED R. CIV. P. 82. By way of contrast, the Rules Enabling Act’s famous proviso 
that the Rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,” 28 U.S.C. 
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actions or for settlements. A court that lacks jurisdiction over a claim 
in class-action litigation does not magically acquire jurisdiction 
because the class action settles. 
3.  Rule 23 
Rule 23 itself does not allow novel future-conduct claims to be 
part of a class action. A settlement-only class action may not 
circumvent the threshold requirements of Rule 23(a)(2).253 A class 
can be certified only with respect to “common questions of law or 
fact.”254 Novel future-conduct claims present neither. There are no 
common questions of fact because there cannot be: there are no facts 
about the conduct yet, only possibilities.255 And there are no common 
questions of law because the legal claims are unripe. If there were a 
common, ripe issue of law shared by the class, then issue preclusion 
could apply.256 
Other parts of Rule 23 reinforce the interpretation that the 
phrase “common questions of law or fact” in 23(a)(2) refers only to 
actual, litigable claims and genuine, present issues of law. The “claims 
or defenses of the representative parties” can only be typical if class 
 
§ 2072(b) (2006), does not provide an independent limit on the settlement of novel future-
conduct claims. A broad settlement power may be an arbitrary and unfair delegation to 
class counsel of the procedural ability to compromise substantive rights, but it does not 
itself abridge them. While others have raised Rules Enabling Act objections to expansive 
class actions, see, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Derek T. Apanovitch, The Constitutional 
Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under 
Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 492–93 (1997); Martin H. Redish & Uma M. 
Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and the Politicization of the Federal 
Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1314–15 (2006), in 
the words of Rocket J. Squirrel, “But that trick never works.” The Supreme Court has 
been notably unreceptive to arguments that provisions of the Federal Rules exceed the 
authority delegated by Congress in the Act. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 (2010) (holding that Rule 23 is within the scope of 
the Rules Enabling Act even when it conflicts with a state law prohibiting certain forms of 
class actions). But see Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (invoking Rules 
Enabling Act as support for narrow construction of Rule 23). 
 253. Amchem Prods, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–22 (1997). 
 254. FED R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
 255. See James Grimmelmann, Three Theories of Copyright in Ratings, 14 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 851, 877 (2012) (discussing existential status of “facts” about future 
events). 
 256. Of course, a class concerned about future conduct may share some common 
factual and legal questions. So, for example, a group of individuals with a shared disease 
who are concerned about working conditions at a proposed factory may have in common 
the question of whether the disease qualifies as a “disability” under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006). But this question can only be resolved in a 
lawsuit properly presenting it: a lawsuit about conditions at an actual factory, not a purely 
hypothetical one. The same limit applies to settlements. 
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members have “claims” in the first place.257 It only makes sense for 
the court to “define . . . the class claims, issues, or defenses” if the 
class action will actually be limited to those “claims, issues, or 
defenses.”258 And the class action will result in a “judgment”: i.e., the 
exercise of the court’s adjudicatory power.259 Rule 23 treats the class 
action as a mechanism for aggregating existing, litigable claims; novel 
future-conduct releases transgress that limit.260 
D.  Answering Doctrinal Objections 
This section answers two objections to the jurisdictional 
justification for parity of preclusion. Both of them claim that federal 
courts routinely approve settlements that would be flatly illegal under 
parity of preclusion. Some cases, like Firefighters, approve 
settlements that provide broader relief than would have been 
available at trial. Others, like the Supreme Court’s Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co. v. Epstein,261 approve settlements that release claims 
that could never have been heard in the forum court at all. Neither 
objection is on point; understanding why requires closer attention to 
the cases in question. 
1.  Remedies Not Available at Trial 
The first objection is that some cases approve consent decrees, as 
in Firefighters, that “provide[] broader relief than the court could 
 
 257. FED R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
 258. FED R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B); see also id. 23(c)(2)(B)(iii) (requiring notice of “the 
class claims, issues, or defenses”; id. 23(e) (allowing settlement of “[t]he claims, issues, or 
defenses”). Adam Milasincic argues that Rule 23(c)(1)(B) is an “easy-to-satisfy 
administrative instruction” intended only to “separat[e] the certified from the 
noncertified,” but even this Rule 23(c)(1)(B) minimalist accepts by assumption that the 
class action must actually be confined to “claims, issues, or defenses.” Adam Milasincic, 
Note, Disorder Certifying a Class: Misinterpretations of Rule 23(c)(1)(B) and a Proposed 
Alternative, 97 VA. L. REV. 979, 1006, 1017 (2011). 
 259. FED R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (“class judgment”); id. 23(c)(3) (“judgment”); id. 
23(d)(1)(B)(ii) (notice of “proposed extent of the judgment”). 
 260. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1443 (2010) (“A class action, no less than traditional joinder (of which it is a species), 
merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of 
in separate suits.”). Scholars presently debate the extent to which the class is more than 
just a scaled-up version of joinder. See generally Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: 
Joinder or Representational Device?, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 459 (1983) (exploring “broad 
patterns” of the joinder and representational models of class actions); Alexandra D. 
Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939 (2011) (discussing 
“aggregation” versus “entity” views of class actions); Redish & Kastanek, supra note 237 
(objecting to class actions as qualitatively different from conjoined individual lawsuits). 
 261. 516 U.S. 367 (1996). 
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have awarded after a trial.”262 If courts have jurisdiction to award 
broader remedies, why not to impose broader releases? For example, 
in Sansom Committee. v. Lynn,263 the Third Circuit approved a 
consent decree that was “several hundred pages long and set[] out 
precise specifications for everything from the type of stone and wood 
that [could] be used in rehabilitating the houses to . . . methods of 
vermin control and refuse disposal.”264 
The answer is simply that remedies and releases really are 
different. “Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of 
a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for 
breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”265 The 
concerns that limit the application of this equitable power—such as 
federalism and separation of powers266—are substantially weaker in 
consent decrees because the defendant has individually agreed to 
waive such protections.267 As long as the remedies “spring from and 
serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction”268 the court has the power to put them in a consent 
decree.269 Releases for novel future-conduct claims, on the other 
hand, “resolve” nothing: the entire point of the discussion above is 
that they deal with nonjusticiable claims outside the court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction.270 
 
 262. Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 
(1986); see also supra notes 97–106 and accompanying text. 
 263. 735 F.2d 1535 (Becker, J., concurring). 
 264. Id. at 1543 n.4: see also Brief of Google in Support, supra note 36, at 9 (quoting 
Sansom). 
 265. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). 
 266. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 124–33 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(giving history of structural injunction jurisprudence and arguing for narrower judicial 
equitable powers). 
 267. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 525 (“However, in addition to the law which forms the 
basis of the claim, the parties’ consent animates the legal force of a consent decree.”). 
 268. Id. 
 269. The same is true of the numerous other cases cited by Google and the plaintiffs in 
Authors Guild. Cases that actually involve promises made to the class include Frew v. 
Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004); Jeff D. v. Kempthorne, 365 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2004); 
Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1989); Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1485 
(10th Cir. 1989); In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 
1987); Miller v. Woodmoor Corp., No 74-F-988, 1978 WL 1146 (D. Colo. Sept. 28, 1978); 
and Levin v. Mississippi River Corp., 59 F.R.D. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Google and the 
Authors Guild plaintiffs cited two Rule 23(b)(1) cases, both of which required stringent 
prerequisites to ensure that the future-conduct claims being released had been at stake in 
the underlying lawsuits challenging the professional leagues’ draft systems. See White v. 
Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1390 (D. Minn. 1993); Robertson v. Nat’l 
Basketball Ass’n, 72 F.R.D. 64, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff’d 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 270. See supra Parts IV.C.1–.2. 
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2.  Multi-Jurisdiction Releases 
The second objection is that the Supreme Court in Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein271 approved: 
the release of a claim based on the identical factual predicate as 
that underlying the claims in the settled class action even 
though the claim was not presented and might not have been 
presentable in the class action.272 
At first blush, this language seems inconsistent with parity of 
preclusion: it permits the settlement of claims that perhaps could not 
have been litigated. But there is a subtle difference, related to why 
those claims could not have been presented. The quoted language 
comes originally from TBK Partners v. Western Union Corp.273 The 
class action there was a suit in federal court under the federal 
securities laws, but the settlement would also have released appraisal 
claims arising under New York law that were (allegedly) subject to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of New York state courts.274 These state 
claims were based on the same factual allegations as the federal 
claims—an alleged failure to preserve a separate corporate identity 
following a long-term lease of all corporate assets that was in effect a 
merger—but they could not have been presented in the federal 
action.275 Matsushita presented the reverse situation: the release of 
exclusively federal claims in state courts.276 
In both situations, the claim itself is justiciable, but a rule of 
subject-matter jurisdiction has allocated the claim to a different court. 
These rules advance policies of federalism and of orderly division of 
responsibilities within a court system; they keep courts from stepping 
on each other’s toes. These policies are important in litigation; much 
less so in settlement. There is no useful purpose to be served in 
making the parties who are filing a settlement in one court walk down 
the street to file a second set of paperwork in another court. 
Because the purpose of parity of preclusion is to prevent the 
settlement of unlitigable claims, it makes sense to adopt this generous 
attitude toward which claims (and issues) are capable of being 
litigated. For a class-action settlement to release a claim, it is enough 
 
 271. 516 U.S. 367 (1996). 
 272. Id. at 377 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 273. See 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 274. Id. at 458–60. 
 275. See id. 
 276. See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 367. Matsushita itself can be distinguished on a second 
ground: it was decided as a matter of statutory full faith and credit and so did not truly 
confront the jurisdictional issue. Id. at 373. 
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that it could be precluded by a class action in any court, not just by a 
class action in the forum court.277 These claims are effectively litigable 
in the other court; indeed, they could be settled there. A settlement in 
the forum court should also be able to release them. 
The harder part is explaining why such releases do not violate 
the jurisdictional arguments given above. A claim that could not have 
been brought in a forum for reasons of subject-matter jurisdiction 
cannot be precluded under claim preclusion.278 But parity of 
preclusion embraces issue preclusion as well, and issue preclusion is 
more willing to consider the policies underlying the allocation of 
jurisdiction among courts.279 Matsushita illustrates precisely how this 
flexibility can work: in considering the preclusive effect Delaware 
would give to a settlement entered by one of its courts, the Supreme 
Court explicitly thought through the federalism polices at stake and 
Delaware’s judgments about the authority vested in its courts.280 TBK 
Partners did much the same in reverse, and even identified the 
common essential issue: “the correct valuation of whatever 
reversionary interest was owed to Gold & Stock’s shareholders.”281 
This is the correct approach. 
E.  Normative Justification 
Informally, parity-of-preclusion means that future-conduct 
claims may be released only when they are closely connected to 
something the defendant has already done. This restriction addresses 
many of the normative concerns with future-conduct releases 
identified in Part II. It does not address them completely, so there is 
still also a need for heightened Rule 23(e)(2) scrutiny. But it does so 
effectively enough that parity-of-preclusion marks a normatively 
attractive dividing line between potentially permissible future-
conduct releases and absolutely forbidden ones. Once again, it is 
helpful to group the analysis by those normative concerns. 
 
 277. But see Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 
1998) (reading TBK Partners and other cases “as pertaining broadly to the law of 
‘releases’ rather than narrowly to the issue of federal court jurisdiction”). Williams is 
discussed on other grounds and criticized herein. See infra Part V.C. 
 278. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) (1980). 
 279. Id. § 28(3) (explaining that preclusive effect depends on “differences in the quality 
or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts or by factors relating to the 
allocation of jurisdiction between them”). 
 280. See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 377–79, 382–83. 
 281. TBK Partners, Ltd. v. W. Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460–61 (2d Cir. 1982). 
CITE AS 91 N.C. L. REV. 387 (2012) 
456 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91 
 
1. High Stakes 
It is almost tautological that parity of preclusion can only reduce 
the stakes of potential settlements. If a given claim was at risk in 
litigation, then the stakes are already high enough to include it. True, 
a complaint can be drafted broadly, but we tolerate broad complaints 
in litigation already282 and trust courts to ensure that class members 
are adequately represented to the extent of those claims.283 If the 
scope of settlement authority were narrower, counsel could have the 
incentive to litigate weak and risky claims rather than accepting a 
beneficial settlement. Moreover there are still limits on even a 
broadly drafted complaint.284 There is no way that authors and 
publishers could have lost the right to stop Google from selling 
complete copies of their books, no matter how broad their pleadings. 
For one thing, since Google did not sell and was not about to sell 
complete books, such claims would have been categorically unripe.285 
For another, the infringement case would have been so unequivocal 
that a court could easily conclude that there was no colorable risk of 
loss.286 
2.  Uncertainty 
Grounding future-conduct releases in the defendant’s past 
conduct introduces specificity: we can better anticipate the future if 
we know that it will be like the past. This makes it easier to predict 
the relevant conduct and its consequences, thereby helping counsel, 
class members, and the court. They can look at what the defendant 
has already been doing to guess what it will do in the future. It is 
much easier to feel comfortable about a settlement allowing Google 
 
 282. See FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a) (permitting a party to join in one complaint “as many 
claims as it has against an opposing party”). 
 283. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (establishing standards for the appointment of class 
counsel, including that counsel will “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the 
class”). 
 284. See supra Part IV.A (discussing pleading doctrines). 
 285. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 11 CV 6351(HB), 2012 WL 4808939, at 
*7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012) (holding that claims against Google’s library partners for 
cancelled plan to distribute complete copies of books were unripe); Authors Guild v. 
Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Google did not scan the books to 
make them available for purchase . . . .”). 
 286. Indeed, the Authors Guild court did just that. Authors Guild, 770 F.Supp.2d at 678 
(“Google would have no colorable defense to a claim of infringement based on the 
unauthorized copying and selling or other exploitation of entire copyrighted books.”); see 
also Transcript of Fairness Hearing, supra note 87, at 150 (“THE COURT: If Google had 
been digitizing entire books and not just making portions available but making the entire 
portions available and indeed selling them, would that be something that Google would 
have tried to defend? MS. DURIE: Selling the work, no.”). 
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to create a search index than about one allowing it to sell books. The 
search index Google has spent the last seven years building is a very 
good illustration of how a search index would work, whereas basic 
features of the proposed bookstore and subscription service were still 
giant question marks as of the time the settlement was rejected. Past 
performance is no guarantee of future results, but it is better than 
past nothing. 
3.  Moral Hazard 
It is harder to set up perverse incentives if one does not have 
novel conduct to work with. The question to class members is simply 
whether they will be able to tolerate what the defendant is already 
doing and, if so, at what price. The court can similarly have more 
confidence that the arrangement it is blessing is not unduly 
dangerous, if it has managed to exist already without problem. 
Moreover, a defendant seeking to undertake an activity will need to 
be prepared to actually engage in the activity, without the cover of 
the settlement, and risk the consequences. This skin in the game gives 
the class more negotiating leverage because it leaves litigation as a 
credible threat.287 
4.  Concentrated Power 
Future-conduct releases can still give a defendant concentrated 
power, but with parity of preclusion, that power is limited to the 
continuation of the power the defendant has already claimed. This 
pulls potential challenges forward in time: for example, antitrust suits 
by third parties need not wait until after the settlement. Parity also 
assists the defendant’s competitors, because if the defendant could 
have obtained the rights it seeks through litigation, anyone similarly 
situated could do likewise. This was one of the key defects of the 
Google Books settlement: it created a legal platform that was usable 
only by Google and not available to other book scanning 
institutions.288 
 
 287. Cf. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997) (“Class counsel 
confined to settlement negotiations could not use the threat of litigation to press for a 
better offer.”). Crucially, this alternative would also produce the attorney’s fees needed to 
motivate class counsel to consider litigation instead of settlement. 
 288. See generally Grimmelmann, supra note 128 (discussing obstacles standing in the 
way of potential competitors looking to establish similar programs). 
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5.  Separation of Powers 
Tying future-conduct releases to the scope of litigation 
immediately brings them back to the core judicial function: the 
resolution of disputes. The decisions of the legislature are still given 
effect through the bodies of law that shape and constrain the 
underlying lawsuit. The resulting settlements may have substantial 
prospective effects and apply broadly, but they are no longer wholly 
untethered from legislative enactments. A class-action lawsuit gives 
the court license to settle that lawsuit, rather than being an excuse to 
get the parties into court and play Let’s Make a Deal. 
V. APPLICATIONS 
Not only are heightened scrutiny and parity-of-preclusion 
normatively attractive when considered in the abstract, they also yield 
sensible results when applied to specific cases. This Part considers a 
test suite of seven actual settlements containing future-conduct 
releases. In each case, applying this Article’s recommendations—
heightened scrutiny and parity-of-preclusion—yields doctrinally and 
normatively appealing results for clearer and more generalizable 
reasons than the courts themselves have given. 
A.  Authors Guild v. Google, Inc. 
Parity of preclusion asks whether the plaintiff authors and 
publishers could have lost in litigation their future-conduct claims 
against Google for selling complete books. The answer is clearly 
“no,” and Authors Guild supplies a clear, cogent explanation of why. 
The underlying lawsuit did not bring claims predicated on a theory of 
infringement for selling complete books: 
This case was brought to challenge Google’s use of “snippets,” 
as plaintiffs alleged that Google’s scanning of books and display 
of snippets for online searching constituted copyright 
infringement. . . . There was no allegation that Google was 
making full books available online, and the case was not about 
full access to copyrighted works.289 
 
 289. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 678. Indeed, now that the case has returned to 
litigation, the Authors Guild does not allege that Google sells complete books. See 
Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment (redacted), Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 
1:05-CV-08136-DC), ECF No. 1054 ¶ 53 (“Google has digitally copied over four million 
in-copyright English language books[;] . . . distributed complete digital copies of over 2.7 
million of in-copyright books to libraries[;] . . . and displayed verbatim expression as 
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More importantly, the plaintiffs could not have brought claims 
predicated on such a theory: 
Google did not scan the books to make them available for 
purchase, and indeed, Google would have no colorable defense 
to a claim of copyright infringement based on the unauthorized 
copying and selling or other exploitation of entire copyrighted 
books. Yet, the ASA would grant Google the right to sell full 
access to copyrighted works that it would otherwise have no 
right to exploit.290 
Taken together, these two points show that the parity-of-preclusion 
test unambiguously forbade the settlement. There was no plausible 
way that Google’s conduct in scanning and indexing books could have 
put in play the class’s future claims for future sales of complete books. 
No possible fair use victory in the underlying lawsuit could have given 
Google the rights the settlement conferred on it, because the scope of 
the fair use defense is tied to specific uses. It would have been 
evaluated as to the display of snippets, not as to the sale of complete 
books. Authors Guild thus reaches the right result. 
Unfortunately because the court was saddled with the identical 
factual predicate doctrine, it surrounded these two passages with 
other statements whose relationship to the core preclusion issue is 
less clear. The court gave this discussion of the “scope of the 
pleadings”: 
  The parties argue that the pleadings are not limited to 
plaintiffs’ claims with respect to the display of snippets, citing 
the Third Amended Complaint. While it is true that the 
pleadings refer to broader conduct (including the creation of 
‘‘digital copies’’ of books), the copying and display of 
copyrighted material occurred in the context of ‘‘Google Book 
Search,’’ which ‘‘is designed to allow users to search the text of 
books online. The digital archiving of the Books that are the 
subject of this lawsuit was undertaken by Google as part of 
Google Book Search.’’291 
This passage was a nonresponsive answer to an irrelevant argument. 
It does not matter that the complaint went beyond scanning and 
snippet display if Google’s past conduct did not put the legality of 
full-text sales in play. To the extent that the complaint objected to 
 
snippets from millions of in-copyright books over the Internet in response to search 
requests from its users.”). 
 290. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 678. 
 291. Id. (citations omitted). 
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full-text sales, it raised only unripe, nonjusticiable claims. That the 
scanning and snippet display took place “in the context of ‘Google 
Book Search’ ”292 says nothing, by itself, about what legal issues the 
suit raised. 
Similarly, the court went on to write: 
The ASA would grant Google control over the digital 
commercialization of millions of books, including orphan books 
and other unclaimed works. And it would do so even though 
Google engaged in wholesale, blatant copying, without first 
obtaining copyright permissions. While its competitors went 
through the ‘‘painstaking’’ and ‘‘costly’’ process of obtaining 
permissions before scanning copy- righted books, ‘‘Google by 
comparison took a shortcut by copying anything and everything 
regardless of copyright status.’’ As one objector put it: ‘‘Google 
pursued its copyright project in calculated disregard of authors’ 
rights. Its business plan was: ‘So, sue me.’ ”293 
The tone of moral condemnation was understandable, if 
unwarranted—but the idea that Google should not be rewarded for 
its “shortcut” was exactly backwards. The problem with the 
settlement was that it went beyond the underlying lawsuit. If Google 
had not scanned books at all, the settlement would have been even 
more unwarranted, more hypothetical, more disconnected from the 
lawsuit. The court should have been more concerned that Google was 
trying to get the benefits of a full-books settlement without exposing 
itself to any meaningful risk, than that Google acted too aggressively 
in scanning books. 
The parity-of-preclusion principle shows that a narrower 
settlement of the case could have included some future-conduct 
elements.294 Imagine a scanning-and-snippets settlement: one that 
allows Google to scan books, build a search index, and show snippets 
to users, in exchange for some compensation to class members. Such 
a settlement would pass muster under the parity-of-preclusion test, 
because these are precisely the activities it has been engaged in for 
the last eight years. If Google wins its pending motion for summary 
judgment on its fair use defense, it will be legally entitled to keep on 
 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 678–79 (citations omitted). 
 294. See Statement of Interest II, supra note 11, at 8 (“[A] properly defined and 
adequately represented class of copyright holders may be able to settle a lawsuit over past 
conduct by licensing a somewhat broader range of conduct.”). 
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scanning and indexing books.295 Thus, future conduct raising the same 
legal issues—scanning, indexing, and snippet display—would properly 
be within the scope of a revised settlement. 
Events following the settlement’s rejection illustrate how little 
parity of preclusion interferes with normal class-action litigation. In 
December 2011, the author plaintiffs moved for class certification.296 
Even though the court had previously held in rejecting the settlement 
that “the class plaintiffs ha[d] not adequately represented the 
interests of at least certain class members[,]”297 it granted class 
certification, holding that a subset of those lead plaintiffs would be 
“adequate representatives of the class.”298 There is no contradiction. 
The Authors Guild’s handpicked plaintiffs are adequate 
representatives to vindicate class members’ existing rights. They are 
not adequate representatives to negotiate a forward-looking 
publishing deal through a settlement. No one is. 
A ruling in a closely related case in October 2012 also 
underscores the point that scanning and indexing were genuinely at 
stake but that full-text sales were not. The Authors Guild also sued 
Google’s library partners in a case with the caption of Authors Guild, 
Inc. v. HathiTrust.299 Four of the libraries had announced an Orphan 
Works Project, which would have created a process to flag certain 
books as being orphans, and then made digital copies of those books 
available to library patrons.300 After authors noticed serious problems 
with the libraries’ processes—the initial list of “orphans” included 
Walter Lippman’s The Communist World and Ours301—but before 
any of the books were actually made available, the libraries 
 
 295. See Defendant Google Inc.’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Its Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Summary Adjudication, 
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 CV 8136-
DC), ECF No. 1032. 
 296. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, 
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), appeal docketed, No. 12-
3200 (2nd Cir. Aug. 14, 2012) (Nos. 05 Civ. 8136 (DC), 10 Civ. 2977 (DC)), ECF No. 990. 
 297. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d. at 679. 
 298. Authors Guild, 282 F.R.D. at 394. But see Order of Aug. 14, 2012, Authors Guild, 
__ F.3d __ (No. 12-2402) (granting Google permission to appeal class certification). 
 299. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 11 CV 6351(HB), 2012 WL 4808939, at *1–
3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012). 
 300. Id. at *2. 
 301. Orphan Row: Now It’s Your Turn, AUTHORS GUILD (Sept. 14, 2011), http://blog. 
authorsguild.org/2011/09/14/orphan-row-now-its-your-turn-2/; Found One! We Re-Unite an 
Author with an “Orphaned Work,” AUTHORS GUILD (Sept. 14, 2011), 
http://blog.authorsguild.org/2011/09/14/found-one-we-re-unite-an-author-with-an-
%E2%80%9Corphaned-work-%E2%80%9D/. 
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suspended the Orphan Works Project.302 The Authors Guild and 
other authors’ groups sued the libraries over the Orphan Works 
Project and also over their use of digital copies given to them by 
Google to create a search engine.303 The court held that the search 
engine was a fair use304 but refused to pass on the Orphan Works 
Project, which it held was unripe for adjudication.305 In other words, 
as a result of the HathiTrust litigation, the plaintiffs have lost the right 
to object to the libraries’ use of scans to provide a search engine, but 
not the right to object if the libraries in the future start making full 
books available.306 This distinction is essentially the same one the 
Authors Guild court made in the context of a settlement; both courts 
got it right. 
B.  In re Literary Works in Electronic Databases Copyright 
Litigation 
The Literary Works opinion grew out of a cluster of lawsuits 
informally known as the “freelancers” suits. Where the Google Books 
suit is about databases of books; the freelancers suits were about 
databases of articles. In the 1970s and 1980s, periodicals began 
licensing their articles to electronic databases.307 While the details 
varied substantially, most of the databases treated the article as the 
fundamental unit: users searched for and read individual articles, 
rather than reading through an issue from one page to the next.308 In 
 
 302. U-M Library Statement on the Orphan Works Project, MLIBRARY (Sept. 16, 
2011), http://www.lib.umich.edu/news/u-m-library-statement-orphan-works-project. 
 303. HathiTrust, 2012 WL 4808939, at *3. 
 304. Id. at *10–14. 
 305. Id. at *7–8. 
 306. Two qualifications should be noted. First, the court did allow the libraries to make 
full-text books available to the print-disabled, but this part of the holding was confined to 
the print-disabled, as there was no suggestion that the libraries had made the books 
available to anyone else. Id. at *15. Second, as of this writing, the case has been appealed 
to the Second Circuit. Notice of Appeal, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 1:11-cv-
06351-HB (2d Cir. Nov. 8, 2012). 
 307. See generally MICHAEL A. BANKS, ON THE WAY TO THE WEB 63–73 (2008) 
(discussing 1980s movement toward full-text online availability and royalties issues); 
CHARLES P. BOURNE & TRUDI BELLARDO HAHN, A HISTORY OF ONLINE 
INFORMATION SERVICES, 1963-1976, at 366–68 (2003) (discussing 1970s development of 
online databases and licensing issues). Debates over copyright issues followed the creation 
of these databases even before they offered full-text downloads. See Kristin R. 
Eschenfelder, Anuj C. Desai, & Greg Downey, The Pre-Internet Downloading 
Controversy: The Evolution of Use Rights for Digital Intellectual and Cultural Works, 27 
INFO. SOC’Y 69, 74–75 (2011). 
 308. See Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 808–09 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
[hereinafter Tasini I], rev’d, 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Tasini II], aff’d, 533 
U.S. 483 (2001) [hereinafter Tasini III]. 
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the early 1990s, freelancers and the periodicals began to spar over 
whether their contracts (many of which were oral) allowed such 
licensing.309 
In the first round of litigation, six freelance authors led by 
Jonathan Tasini sued the New York Times, Newsday, and Sports 
Illustrated for licensing their articles to various databases.310 In 2001, 
the Supreme Court agreed 7–2 with the freelancers, opening the 
floodgates.311 Three different groups of freelancers filed putative class 
actions against various electronic databases,312 which were 
consolidated in the Southern District of New York.313 While the 
freelancers had a strong case post-Tasini, it was not completely open-
and-shut, in part because different publishers had used different 
contract forms. After three years of mediation, the parties announced 
a proposed settlement in March 2005.314 
The basic structure of the settlement was comparatively simple. 
Like the Google Books settlement, it contained both a release for 
past infringements and one for future infringements.315 Looking back, 
the databases and the publishers would have been forgiven for their 
past uses of class members’ articles.316 Looking forward, the databases 
would have been allowed to continue including class members’ 
articles under their licenses from the publishers.317 In return, the 
 
 309. See, e.g., Tasini I, at 807 (describing contracts entered into by defendants); 
Deirdre Carmody, Writers Fight for Electronic Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1994, at B20 
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 310. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 807. 
 311. See Tasini III, 533 U.S. at 506. 
 312. Posner v. Gale Group, Inc., No. 00-cv-07376 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 28, 2000); Laney 
v. Dow Jones & Co., No. 00-cv-00769 (D. Del. filed Aug. 22, 2000); Authors Guild v. 
Dialog Corp., No. 00-cv-06049 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 15, 2000). The alert reader will have 
noted that these filing dates predate the Supreme Court’s decision in Tasini III. The suits 
were filed following the Second Circuit’s decision in favor of the freelancers in Tasini II, 
but were stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision. See In re Literary Works in Elec. 
Databases Copyright Litig., 2001 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 33406, 33408 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 313. See In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 2001 Copyright L. 
Dec. (CCH) 33147, 33148 (J.P.M.L. 2000). One of the many ironies of these cases is that 
the National Writers Union and American Society of Journalists and Authors were co-
plaintiffs with the Authors Guild in the consolidated freelancers suit and objectors to the 
Authors Guild-led Google Books settlement. See id.  
 314. See Settlement Agreement Dated March 31, 2005, In re Literary Works in Elec. 
Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242 (2nd Cir. 2011) (Nos. 05–5943–cv(L), 06–0223), 
reprinted in Joint Appendix at 107, Reed Elsevier Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010) 
(No. 08-103), 2009 WL 1423539, at *107. 
 315. See id. § 1.n, at *113–15. 
 316. See id. (past uses); id. § 5.b at *127–28 (future uses). 
 317. As in the Google Books settlement, freelancer class members who remained in 
the class could choose to deny permission for future uses of their works. If they did so, 
however, their compensation would be reduced by thirty five percent. Id. § 5.a, at *127. 
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publishers and databases would have created a settlement fund of 
between $10 million and $18 million to be paid to copyright owners.318 
Owners of articles that had been registered with the Copyright Office 
would receive one-time payments of $150 or $1500 or more;319 owners 
of unregistered works would receive payments starting at $5.320 
Following a detour through the Supreme Court on an unrelated 
jurisdictional issue,321 the Second Circuit rejected the settlement for 
inadequate representation.322 
On the way to this holding, however, the court also dealt with the 
future-conduct issue. The objectors had invoked the identical factual 
 
Unlike the Google Books settlement’s toggleable right to Exclude, however, this back-end 
opt-out right was a one-time option. 
 318. See id. § 3.a, at *116 (minimum); id. § 3.f, at *119 (maximum). 
 319. See id. § 4.a–.b, at *122–23. 
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these payments, see id. § 4.d, at *123–24, and individual payments were to be scaled down 
if the total claims exceeded $18 million, see id. § 4.f, at *124–25. No copyright owner’s 
payment, however, could be reduced beneath $5. See id. § 4.j, at 126. 
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Copyright Litig., 509 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2007) rev’d sub nom Reed Elsevier, Inc., 130 S. 
Ct. 1237. The Second Circuit’s theory was that since the Copyright Act requires 
registration of United States works with the Copyright Office as a precondition to file suit 
for infringement, the class members whose works were unregistered were never properly 
before the district court. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006). After briefing, the Second Circuit 
indeed ruled that the requirement was jurisdictional, and so vacated the settlement. See In 
re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 509 F.3d 116, 128 (2nd. Cir. 2007), 
rev’d sub nom Reed Elsevier, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 1237. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 129 S. Ct. 1523 (2009). Since the plaintiffs, 
defendants, and objectors below all argued for jurisdiction (they disagreed only over the 
settlement’s substantive terms), the Supreme Court also appointed an amicus curiae to 
defend the Second Circuit’s opinion. See Reed Elsevier, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 1240. After 
argument, the Court reversed the Second Circuit 8–0; Justice Sotomayor, who had been 
the district judge in Tasini I, supra note 308, recused herself. See Reed Elsevier, Inc., 130 S. 
Ct. at 1240. While the Court declined to decide whether a federal court would be obliged 
to grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss an infringement case involving an unregistered 
copyright, id. at 1249, it held that the registration requirement was not a limit on the 
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1241. Thus, the Court remanded for 
consideration of the settlement’s merits, leading to the Literary Works opinion we are here 
concerned with. Id. at 1241. For an approving discussion of Reed Elsevier, see Howard M. 
Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings”, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 947, 
961 (2011). 
 322. See In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d at 257–58. 
Thus the court of appeals accepted the objectors’ original argument, albeit six years later. 
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predicate doctrine, arguing that “future infringements are distinct 
harms giving rise to independent claims of relief, with factual 
predicates that are different from authors’ past infringement 
claims.”323 The court, however, looked to the complaint: 
  Objectors’ first argument fails to recognize that the 
consolidated complaint seeks injunctive relief for future uses, 
and therefore contemplates these alleged future injuries. Put 
another way, a trial of this case would determine whether it is 
permissible for publishers to continue to sell and license the 
works. Accordingly, regardless of whether future infringements 
would be considered independent injuries, the Settlement’s 
release of claims regarding future infringements is not 
improper.324 
This was the correct result, and for almost the correct reason. The 
Literary Works settlement was consistent with the parity-of-
preclusion test because the publishers had already, for years, been 
licensing the articles to the databases. If the publishers had won on 
their theory of the case—that the freelancers had granted implied 
licenses for database uses—then issue preclusion would have barred 
the freelancers from objecting to those uses in the future, even if they 
constituted separate acts of reproduction leading to separate 
infringements. Thus, the settlement permitted publishers to do no 
more than they could have won at trial. The court correctly focused 
on what would have been “determin[ed]” by a “trial of this case,”325 
as the parity of preclusion demands. The only thing that is slightly off 
here is the emphasis on the complaint at all. What matters are the 
underlying facts about the defendant’s past conduct; the complaint is 
of course not conclusive as to the facts it alleges.326 
The contrast between Authors Guild and Literary Works nicely 
illustrates the workings of the parity-of-preclusion test. In Authors 
Guild, Google had never sold complete copies of the plaintiffs’ books, 
and it was not about to. In Literary Works, however, the publishers 
had been licensing, and the databases had been displaying, the articles 
for years. They had plausible arguments that doing so was legal, and 
one court even agreed with them. The same future conduct that was a 
major break from the defendant’s past conduct in Authors Guild was 
 
 323. Id. at 248. 
 324. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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a continuation of the defendant’s past conduct in Literary Works. The 
former was an improper settlement; the latter was proper. 
C.  Williams v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease 
Williams v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc.327 involved 
dueling class actions over early termination fees (ETFs) in auto leases 
issued by the defendant, GECAL.328 The first class action, the 
“Williams” suit, settled: the class included individuals who entered 
into a lease assigned to GECAL between January 1, 1987 and July 21, 
1995, and settled “all claims which might have been asserted in the 
Actions . . . arising out of disclosures made on or in connection with 
vehicle leases assigned to GECAL, out of the reasonableness or 
validity of the charges and other terms contained in such leases, and 
out of the collection or attempted collection of charges imposed 
under such lease forms.”329 The court approved the Williams 
settlement in December 1995, and entered a final judgment in 
January 1996. 330 
The second class action, the “Dooner” suit, was filed in July 
1996.331 When GECAL asked the district court in the Williams case to 
enforce an anti-suit injunction against the Dooner plaintiffs,332 they 
argued that the injunction did not apply to them because none of 
them had terminated their leases as of the July 21, 1995 cut-off 
date.333 Thus, they claimed, their claims against GECAL were not 
ripe as of the Williams settlement, and they were therefore not 
subject to its releases.334 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the trial court’s injunction 
against the Dooner suit335 in a carefully reasoned but ultimately 
misguided opinion. It started by noting that the Williams complaint 
raised two kinds of claims: failure to disclose the ETFs in the leases, 
and charging unreasonable ETFs.336 The former were ripe 
immediately, but there was a substantial question as to whether the 
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 328. Id. at 268. 
 329. Id. at 271. 
 330. See Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, No. 94-C-7410, 1995 WL 765266, 
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latter were ripe before a customer actually terminated the lease and 
was charged an unreasonable ETF.337 Thus, the Dooner plaintiffs 
were unquestionably members of the Williams class and 
unquestionably had ripe disclosure claims against GECAL that the 
Williams settlement could release.338 
The court should have stopped there. The settlement released 
only “all claims which might have been asserted” in the Williams 
action.339 If the Dooner plaintiffs’ unreasonable-ETF claims were 
truly unripe as of July 21, 1995, then the Williams settlement by its 
own terms did not purport to release them. It is not even necessary to 
invoke parity of preclusion. 
Instead, the Seventh Circuit justified the injunction on the basis 
of the identical factual predicate doctrine. It reasoned that the factual 
predicate was “the leases and the potential for an early termination 
penalty,” so that “even if the [unreasonable ETF] claims were not 
ripe, they were closely enough related to the disclosure claims that 
everything could be resolved in the settlement.”340 This argument 
illustrates the dangers of taking the identical factual predicate 
doctrine at face value. The problem is that to the extent the 
unreasonable-ETF claims were unripe, it was because they involved 
future conduct: GECAL’s contingent attempts to impose fees when a 
consumer actually terminated her auto lease. Thus, the Seventh 
Circuit approved a future-conduct release without entirely realizing 
it. 
It is hard at this distance to say whether this was harmless or 
prejudicial error. One possibility is that “the computation of the early 
termination payments might be ministerial at any given point in 
time.”341 If so, then parity of preclusion would have allowed the 
Williams releases to cover the unreasonable-ETF claims: the essential 
legal issues could all have been squarely presented as of July 21, 1995. 
But it is also possible that GECAL retained sufficient discretion 
under the leases to charge either reasonable or unreasonable ETFs. If 
so, then litigation over the leases could not establish the propriety of 
the fees; neither claim preclusion nor issue preclusion would apply to 
the unreasonable-ETF claims. 
Indeed, on this view, the Williams settlement gives a nice 
illustration of moral hazard in future-conduct releases. Class 
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members received $50 or $100 certificates.342 But, as one of the 
objectors pointed out, the ETFs could be $1,000 or more,343 and 
GECAL did not make any promises about the ETFs it would charge 
customers who terminated their leases after the settlement 
deadline.344 The settlement freed GECAL to max out the ETFs it 
collected without fear of the legal consequences. After all, the 
settlement order enjoined leaseholders from suing over the 
“collection or attempted collection of charges imposed under such 
lease forms.”345 A $100 coupon for a legally risk-free $1,000 ETF is a 
good trade from GECAL’s perspective, but perhaps less so from class 
members’ perspective. This is not to say that the Seventh Circuit was 
necessarily wrong to enforce the settlement—only that it did not 
provide a convincing response to the future-conduct issue it 
identified. 
D.  Uhl v. Thoroughbred Technology & Telecommunications, Inc. 
In Uhl v. Thoroughbred Technology and Telecommunications, 
Inc.,346 a telecommunications company known colloquially as T-
Cubed announced plans to lay fiber-optic cables along Norfolk 
Southern Railway rights of way.347 A class of landowners along the 
route objected, bringing slander-of-title and trespass claims that the 
railroad’s easements did not include cable-laying rights.348 In a 
settlement filed the same day, the class agreed, in effect, to grant T-
Cubed the necessary easements in exchange for cash compensation.349 
An objector claimed that the case was nonjusticiable because the 
class members had only “future claims.”350 The Seventh Circuit 
disagreed and upheld the settlement, explaining that the plaintiffs’ 
slander of title claims were already ripe, so that: 
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This is enough to permit the court to address the entire suit, 
including the claims for trespass and the injunction. On these 
facts, those claims are in no way hypothetical; their immediacy 
and their relation to the slander claim is enough to permit the 
court to address the entire controversy.351 
This time the result was arguably consistent with the parity-of-
preclusion test. T-Cubed’s past conduct—its announcement of plans 
to lay cable—really did open it to a slander-of-title suit. That suit 
would have tested T-Cubed’s right to lay cable and, if T-Cubed had 
won, its newly-confirmed easements would have protected it also 
from the trespass claims. True, T-Cubed had not actually gone on 
anyone’s land. But considering its course of conduct, it is factually 
reasonable to say that the future-conduct cable-laying would have 
been a continuation of the past-conduct announcement. 
Of course, this conclusion is debatable to the extent that it 
depends on the factual finding that T-Cubed had real and immediate 
plans to lay cable. There is more than a whiff of collusion about Uhl 
and other railroad-corridor settlement class actions.352 Close scrutiny 
of the settlement’s commercial terms—which the court appears to 
have engaged in—was entirely appropriate. 
E.  Alvarado v. Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority 
Another easement case, Alvarado v. Memphis-Shelby County 
Airport Authority,353 is also illuminating. With FAA approval, the 
defendant Airport Authority planned to expand operations at the 
Memphis International Airport.354 Nearby landowners sued in a class 
action, claiming inverse condemnation. The settlement required class 
members to transfer an avigation easement to the Airport Authority 
in exchange for compensation.355 Functionally, this is eminent domain 
via class-action settlement. But notice the procedural posture: the 
plaintiffs sued in inverse condemnation: that is, they asked the court 
not to block the taking but to provide them with just compensation 
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for it. That is what the tort is for, and the settlement reflected an 
outcome entirely consistent with litigation.356 
Thus, when the court approved the settlement, it did so 
consistently with the parity-of-preclusion test. Alvarado even came 
close to recognizing that the real question is similarity of legal issues. 
The court wrote, “The release in the settlement agreement is not a 
general release, but a release which reserved certain claims and 
barred only prospective claims of the same character as set forth in 
the restated complaint.”357 Replace “of the same character” with 
“raising the same legal issues” and be willing to go behind the face of 
the complaint to the defendant’s actual past conduct, and you have 
the parity-of-preclusion test. 
F.  UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp. 
In UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp.,358 Rupert Murdoch’s media 
corporation, which had been incorporated in Australia, announced 
plans to reincorporate in Delaware.359 Australian corporate law 
prohibits adopting a poison pill without a shareholder vote; Delaware 
corporate law does not.360 Multiple institutional investors threatened 
to vote against the reincorporation, so the News Corporation (“News 
Corp.”) board adopted a policy that it would not adopt or extend a 
poison pill without a shareholder vote.361 Following the 
reincorporation, a hostile acquirer showed up; the board immediately 
turned around and adopted a poison pill.362 
The institutional investors sued over the failure to hold a 
shareholder vote, and got claims for breach of contract and 
promissory estoppel past a motion to dismiss.363 While the case went 
up on appeal, settlement talks began, and the parties filed a proposed 
settlement in early 2006.364 Under the settlement, News Corp. would 
submit its pill for a shareholder vote at its October 2006 meeting. The 
case was to be certified as a class action, and class members would 
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release News Corp. from any liability for the extension of the pill at 
the shareholder meeting. Liberty Media, the would-be acquirer, 
objected.365 
The court considered the future-conduct release categorically 
impermissible. Because the October 2006 meeting had not yet 
happened, it could not be the factual predicate giving rise to the 
lawsuit: 
Thus, it follows that a release is overly broad if it releases 
claims based on a set of operative facts that will occur in the 
future. If the facts have not yet occurred, then they cannot 
possibly be the basis for the underlying action. . . .366 
The court then generalized: 
The rule in Delaware is that a release cannot apply to future 
conduct. Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that 
there is an exception for future conduct arising out of, or 
contemplated by, the settlement itself. . . . For these reasons, I 
conclude that the release is overly broad in that it attempts to 
release claims arising from an event that has not yet happened, 
viz., the October 2006 Rights Plan.367 
This cannot be right, at least as stated. This rule would effectively 
make impossible any settlement that reaches future conduct—even if 
the propriety of that future conduct is precisely the issue at stake in 
the lawsuit. The court’s description of the proposed settlement made 
it sound like a resounding win for class members: they wanted a 
shareholder vote on the poison pill, and News Corp. agreed that it 
would submit its pill for a vote at the forthcoming October 2006 
shareholder meeting.368 Not only does it seem reasonable to allow 
News Corp. a release for doing what the class demanded of it, but 
also the opinion provided no reason to think that submitting the plan 
for a vote could violate class members’ rights in the first place. Thus, 
the settlement would appear to have been consistent with the parity-
of-preclusion test, and the court’s distrust of it comes across as 
unwarranted. 
Nonetheless, the court may have reached the right result for 
reasons that do not appear in the opinion itself. It appears from the 
briefing in the case that the original (non-class) lawsuit focused on the 
propriety of adopting a poison pill without a shareholder vote, but 
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that the release would have also arguably covered the merits of the 
poison pill itself.369 What is more, the class action was framed as a 
mandatory, non-opt-out class.370 Thus, the settlement would 
effectively have deprived Liberty Media of any substantive right to 
object to the terms of the pill. This was a serious problem with the 
settlement, and provided more than sufficient reason to reject it. 
News Corp. was collusively buying off the outside investors who 
objected to the lack of a shareholder vote in order to steal a march on 
Liberty Media and strip it of some of its rights as a shareholder. If so, 
then the court should have explained that this was the real reason the 
settlement was unacceptable, and grounded its holding elsewhere in 
class-action and corporate law. 
G.  Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club 
In Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club,371 the NFL sold 
satellite TV access to its games, but only as part of an all-inclusive 
Sunday Ticket bundle for $139 a season.372 In 1997, a class of 1.8 
million Sunday Ticket purchasers sued the NFL and five teams, 
claiming that the bundling violated the Sherman Act.373 After the 
NFL lost a motion to dismiss based on a statutory exemption in the 
Sports Broadcasting Act, the parties negotiated a proposed 
settlement.374 
Under the settlement, the NFL would have paid $7.5 million to 
class members and offered them 10–15% discounts on NFL 
merchandise.375 Going forward, the NFL would have been required to 
offer individual weeks via satellite at $29.99, along with the season 
package for $159.376 In exchange, class members would have been 
required to release antitrust claims against the NFL for its satellite, 
broadcast, cable, or Internet broadcasts of NFL games, including for 
conduct undertaken each year the settlement remained in effect.377 
The court rejected the settlement on multiple grounds, the most 
significant of which was the scope of the releases. First, the court 
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explained that the expansion from satellite broadcasts to other media 
was problematic: 
The plaintiffs’ complaint does not suggest that they have 
asserted any claims with respect to NFL programming by 
broadcast, cable television, or the Internet. Nevertheless, under 
the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the defendants would 
be released from all claims regarding their programming of 
NFL football games regardless of the technology involved or 
the method of distribution of those games (e.g., in a form that 
bundles those games as does NFL Sunday Ticket or in a form 
that does not).378 
This rationale—that cable and Internet bundling were not at 
issue in the underlying lawsuit, only satellite bundling—is easy to 
understand in terms of the parity-of-preclusion test. Because of the 
medium-by-medium structure of telecommunications regulation, 
those other media presented substantially different legal issues. Nor 
did the settlement require that the NFL’s offerings on cable and the 
Internet parallel the offerings it made via satellite. A win for the NFL 
at trial would not have been conclusive on the legality of its cable and 
Internet broadcasts, and so a settlement could not reach them, either. 
But the parity-of-preclusion test probably would not have blocked a 
settlement that included a prospective release for claims arising out of 
the revised satellite offerings the NFL proposed. These practices were 
directly at issue in the underlying suit, the NFL’s proposal was 
unambiguously more moderate than its past practices, and a victory at 
trial for the NFL would have let it offer the programs the settlement 
authorized. 
The court also gave a second, broader explanation for its holding: 
The release is also too broad because it bars later claims based 
on future conduct. Although the law permits a release to bar 
future claims based on the past conduct of the defendant, this 
release would bar later claims based not only on past conduct 
but also future conduct.379 
This flat rule against future-conduct releases may sound too 
sweeping. But recall that Schwartz was an antitrust case: and antitrust 
law carries a strong public policy against private ordering that would 
displace its rules. Future-conduct releases for antitrust claims are 
impermissible in settlements, regardless of whether they are class 
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actions or not.380 Thus, the settlement could not prospectively bless 
any form of bundling; at most it could resolve claims for past 
bundling. This second holding is not really about class actions or 
parity of preclusion; it is a holding about antitrust law.381 
CONCLUSION 
We must plan for the future, but we have a choice as to how. 
Individuals can make plans for themselves, with promises and 
waivers. Governments can make plans for society, with laws and 
regulations.382 Contract and legislation are the two great and 
legitimate tools of planning: one private and one public. Contract 
reflects individual autonomy: it justifies its far-reaching power 
because the parties themselves have consented to their bargain. 
Legislation reflects societal agreement: it justifies its far-reaching 
power because elections keep legislators broadly accountable to the 
people. Each kind of planning has its proper sphere, each is legitimate 
within that sphere, and there is a crucial role for both in a free and 
democratic society. 
But future-conduct releases are a “monstrous hybrid” between 
private and public planning, the worst of both worlds.383 They impose 
plans on people who have never heard of or consented to them—but 
they are negotiated by self-interested private parties rather than 
elected representatives. Courts are planners of last resort: their job is 
to sort out the consequences of past plans gone awry, not to make 
new plans.384 Courts bearing future-conduct releases undermine both 
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individual autonomy and democratic decision-making. When courts 
take thought for the morrow, they make it harder for individuals and 
legislatures to do the same. Bad planners drive out good. 
Future-conduct settlements are a valuable part of any judicial 
toolkit that includes class actions and settlements. But they must be 
understood—and employed—strictly as a way to resolve disputes 
without the uncertainty and expense of motion practice and trial. 
They can legitimately do what a lawsuit could do, no more, and then 
only under close supervision. Anything further is playing with fire. 
In this age of political decay, future-conduct class-action 
settlements are a sore temptation. The copyright system is broken; 
perhaps class actions could fix it.385 So are the health-care system, the 
financial system, and so much else besides. These unfolding disasters 
are far beyond the capacity of any one person to salvage, or even 
escape; Congress is busy demonstrating that the baleful influence of 
its neglect is rivaled only by the baleful influence of its attention. So 
why not turn things over to the courts, Mephistopheles asks: why not 
let future-conduct releases serve as the foundation for a new form of 
social reform? 
This attitude amounts to the belief that “[o]ne branch is broken, 
so let’s break another branch.”386 The solution to a broken, 
systematically compromised political system is to fix the system.387 
Unbounded future-conduct settlements are an evasion of 
responsibility, an admission of defeat. The turn to them is a turn away 
from the rule of law. 
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